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This thesis is about providing security and privacy to new emergent appli-
cations which are based on special-purpose networks. More precisely, we
study different aspects regarding security and privacy issues related to sen-
sor networks, mobile ad hoc networks, vehicular ad hoc networks and social
networks.
Sensor networks have a wide variety of applications related to event
surveillance like emergency response or habitat monitoring. Two contribu-
tions providing scalable and secure transmission of sensed data are presented.
Ad hoc networks are suited for use in situations where deploying an in-
frastructure is not cost effective or is not possible for any other reason. When
the nodes of an ad hoc network are small mobile devices (e.g. cell phones
or PDAs), such a network is called mobile ad hoc network. If mobile nodes
are embedded in cars, then that network is called vehicular ad hoc network.
Different schemes providing secure and private information transmission in
both types of ad hoc networks are presented.
Social networks differ from the special-purpose networks commented above
in that they are not physical networks. Social networks are applications that
work through classic networks. They can be defined as a community of web
users where each user can publish and share information and services. A
privacy-preserving resource access protocol for social networks is presented.
v
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 






1.1 Situation and objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Many-to-one information transmission for sensor net-
works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.2 Information sharing in MANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.3 Information spread in VANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.4 Resource access in social networks . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Structure of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 State of the Art 13
2.1 Many-to-one information transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Secure many-to-one lossy transmission . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.2 Secure many-to-one lossless transmission . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Information sharing in MANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.1 Privacy, security and incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Information spread in VANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 A posteriori countermeasures against fake messages . . 24
2.3.2 A priori countermeasures against fake messages . . . . 25
vii
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 




2.4 Resource access in social networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 Efficient and secure many-to-one symbol transmission 33
3.1 Secure many-to-one communications based on GDH multisig-
natures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.1 Multisignatures over Gap Diffie-Hellman groups . . . . 35
3.1.2 General assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.3 Reverse bit transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.4 Security analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1.5 Performance analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1.6 Error handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1.7 Generalization to q-ary transmission . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Secure many-to-one communications for resource-constrained
devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.1 General assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.2 Many-to-one q-ary transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.3 Procedure to deal with corrupted messages . . . . . . . 51
3.2.4 Security analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.5 Performance analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4 Secure and private information sharing in MANETs 61
4.1 Distributed information provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1.1 System overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1.2 System architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.3 Security analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1.4 Privacy analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Advertisement dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2.1 System overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 




4.2.2 Set of protocols for advertisement dissemination . . . . 76
4.2.3 Example of an advertisement dissemination . . . . . . 81
4.2.4 Comparison to other reward models . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.5 Security and privacy analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5 Private and trustworthy information spread in VANETs 91
5.1 Cryptographic background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.1.1 Secret sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.1.2 Threshold signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1.3 Privacy in secret sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 Trustworthy privacy-preserving announcements in VANETs . . 96
5.2.1 Non-private protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2.2 Cost analysis of the non-private protocol . . . . . . . . 99
5.2.3 Group-based private protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.4 Extended group-based private protocol . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.5 Semi-private protocol for sparse VANETs . . . . . . . . 106
5.2.6 Compound protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2.7 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6 Private resource access in social networks 121
6.1 Multiplicative privacy homomorphisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2 Homomorphic access control protocol for social networks . . . 123
6.2.1 Homomorphic encryption of rational values . . . . . . . 125
6.2.2 Simple homomorphic protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.2.3 Anonymous homomorphic protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.2.4 Accessing the resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.2.5 Security and privacy analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2.6 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 





7.1 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.2 Results of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.3 Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Our contributions 155
Bibliography 157
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 





1.1 Situation and objectives
The transformation from the Industrial Society to the Information Society
started somewhere between the 1970s and today. In the former, the economy
is based on material goods and how to produce them. In the latter, the
knowledge is the main engine that moves the progress and the development
of humankind. To be useful, the knowledge must be properly managed. It
means that we need effective ways to generate it, store it and process it.
The Information Society is based on the use of computers and the ex-
change of information between them. Two computers communicate (ex-
change information) through a connection (wired or wireless). Different com-
puters connected between them form a computer network.
Computers sharing resources and cooperating between them can solve
large problems which otherwise would be impossible to address by the same
computers working alone [Fost02]. Networked devices can even enable the
emergence of new models and scenarios which represent new opportunities
and challenges. According to that, computer networks are considered an
1
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important advance. Note that the “resource” concept includes the whole
range of things that can be shared in a connected computer system: from
hardware components such as printers to several sources of information: files,
databases, video/audio streams, etc.
Computer networks are everywhere. The most important one is the In-
ternet which is a very huge network composed of several smaller networks.
The Internet allows computers to connect to other computers easily, wher-
ever they may be across the world. This global computer network is one
of the most important innovations of our time, bringing substantial benefits
to economies and societies, but also driving change in the way we live and
work [Euro08].
Despite the big importance of the Internet, the society can still grow. In
this way, researchers continue developing new applications and their com-
munication paradigms. Part of these new proposals are based on special-
purpose networks. Some of such special networks are physically different
from the classic network which consists of static full-fledged computers with
permanent connections between them. Examples of these networks are the
following:
• Sensor networks. These networks consist of resource-constrained wire-
less devices with sensor capabilities. This emerging technology has a
wide variety of applications related to event surveillance like emergency
response, habitat monitoring or defense-related networks.
• Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Such networks are formed by
mobile nodes which are connected in a self-organized way without any
underlying hierarchical infrastructure. Small devices enabled with wire-
less communications technologies (e.g. cell phones or PDAs) are usually
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1.1 Situation and objectives 3
used as nodes in MANETs. Ad hoc networks are suited for use in sit-
uations where deploying an infrastructure is not cost effective or is not
possible for any other reason. One of many possible uses of MANETs is
to provide crisis management services applications, such as in disaster
recovery, where the entire communication infrastructure is destroyed
and reestablishing communication quickly is crucial [Jhu07]. Another
useful situation for MANETs is a scenario without fixed communication
systems where there is the need for any kind of collaborative computing.
Such situation can occur in both business and military environments.
• Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). When the mobile nodes of a
MANET are embedded in cars, such a network is called Vehicular Ad
hoc Network (VANET). This kind of networks can be very useful to
increase the road traffic safety and they will be deployed for real use in
the forthcoming years. As a proof of that, eight important European
vehicle manufacturers have founded the CAR 2 CAR Communication
Consortium [C2cc08]. This non-profit organisation is dedicated to the
objective of further increasing traffic safety and efficiency by means of
inter-vehicle communications.
Sensor networks, MANETs and VANETs differ from classic networks in
the hardware that they use and in the way the nodes are connected between
them. Nonetheless, there are special-purpose networks which are only ap-
plications that work through classic networks. This is the case for social
networks.
Nowadays, social networks have become an important web service [Staa05]
with a broad range of applications: collaborative work, collaborative service
rating, resource sharing, searching new friends, etc. They can be defined as
a community of web users where each network user can publish and share
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information and services (personal data, blogs and, in general, resources).
Social networks have become an object of study both in computer and social
sciences, with even dedicated journals and conferences.
The special-purpose networks described above provide a wide range of
new services and applications. Even though they are expected to improve
the society in several ways, these innovative networks and their related ap-
plications bring also security and privacy issues that must be addressed.
In this thesis, we solve some security and privacy issues related to such
new applications and services. More specifically, our work focuses on:
• Secure information transmission in many-to-one scenarios with resource-
constrained devices such as sensor networks.
• Secure and private information sharing in MANETs.
• Secure and private information spread in VANETs.
• Private resource access in social networks.
1.1.1 Many-to-one information transmission for sensor
networks
Communications can be classified according to the number of involved senders
and receivers. Single-sender paradigms are: one-to-one (unicast) in which a
single sender transmits data to a single receiver; one-to-all (broadcast) in
which one source sends data to all nodes of a network; and one-to-many
(multicast) where a single source transmits to a given subset of nodes.
Efficient one-to-many (and one-to-all) communications are implemented
using a tree communication model. The root of the tree is the source which
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1.1 Situation and objectives 5
sends the data, the intermediate nodes are the routers which receive the con-
tent from their parent node and retransmit it to their child nodes (replicating
it for each child), and the leaves are the receivers. This model provides scal-
ability because the number of receivers can be increased without increasing
the workload nor the bandwidth needs at the source.
At some point, one-to-many applications may require the root of the
tree to collect data from all users. This situation results in many-to-one
communication [Mill99]. If the number of transmitting nodes is large, the
receiver may be overwhelmed by the incoming traffic. This problem is known
as implosion [Quin01].
Implosion resistance is a challenging issue in the design of many-to-one
communication protocols. Such protocols also follow a tree topology. In
this case, the leaves are the senders; the intermediate nodes are routers that
collect messages coming from their children and aggregate them into a single
message that is transmitted up to their parent; finally, the root is the receiver.
Scalability depends on the aggregation operation performed by intermediate
routers.
In addition to their being scalable, many-to-one communications often
need to be secure. Security requirements include confidentiality (an intruder
should not be able to learn the transmitted data), integrity (any data alter-
ation should be detectable by the receiver) and authentication (the source of
the data should be verifiable by the receiver).
There is a general consensus that in scenarios where nodes are resource-
constrained devices the high cost of public-key cryptography is usually not
affordable. Researchers assume that in such scenarios symmetric cryptog-
raphy and hash functions constitute the tools of choice to provide security.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 




However, public-key technology can be selectively deployed in those environ-
ments too. In [Bene05] the author argues that the RSA [Rsa78] public-key
cryptosystem with a small public exponent and Rabin’s [Rabi79] public-key
cryptosystem have fast algorithms for encryption and digital signature ver-
ification which can be used on constrained devices. In contrast, their de-
cryption and signature generation are slow and resource-demanding. Elliptic
curve cryptosystems (ECC, [BlaB05]) provide not only lightweight encryp-
tion and signature verification, but also lightweight decryption and signature
generation which make them suitable for resource-constrained devices.
Sensor networks are an example where secure many-to-one communica-
tions are required in low-cost and resource-constrained devices. Here, the
sensor nodes (which may be very numerous) transmit data to a single col-
lecting center. Security requirements arise when the networks are deployed
in hostile areas.
Due to the relevance of this emerging technology, new lightweight proto-
cols providing secure many-to-one communications should be designed.
1.1.2 Information sharing in MANETs
New-generation mobile devices (e.g. cell phones, PDAs ...) are enabled with
wireless communications technologies which paves the way to a broad range
of services based on mobile ad hoc networks.
MANETs are extremely dynamic. Thus, nodes are constantly changing
their location. This can cause any pair of nodes to be temporarily uncon-
nected. According to that, communication systems for this kind of networks
should not depend on centralized authorities that need to be accessible all
the time.
Information transmission between peers is a basic process in MANETs.
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1.1 Situation and objectives 7
Such networks rely on the data forwarding service to transmit data between
users. It consists of correctly relaying the received packets from node to node
until they reach their final destination. A survey presented in [Djen05] states
the following threads in this procedure:
• Eavesdropping. Malicious nodes can eavesdrop packets in transit and
analyze them to obtain confidential and sensitive information. It is
considered a passive attack.
• Tampering. Dishonest nodes can tamper with the forwarded data to
get some benefits.
• Dropping data packets. Transmitted packets follow multi-hop routes
and pass through mobile nodes. A malicious node which participates
in the routing can drop all packets it gets to forward.
• Selfish behavior. Nodes involved in a MANET usually do not belong
to a single authority and do not pursue a common goal. Therefore,
nodes are not directly interested in forwarding packets for others. In
consequence, there is no reason to trust nodes and assume that they
will cooperate. Even though this is not an intentional attack, it is as
harmful as dropping data packets.
Data eavesdropping and data tampering are commonly solved using cryp-
tography. Cryptography-based secure communications in MANETs have
been widely addressed in the literature [Djen05].
Providing incentives to relaying nodes is a way to prevent peers from
dropping data packets (it can be done intentionally or as a result of a selfish
behavior) [Butt00, Butt03, Sale03]. Nevertheless, provision of incentives to
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nodes in a secure way for both the payer and the payee is not straightforward
and must be addressed properly.
Last but not least, MANET applications may require the interaction be-
tween some devices in order to trade certain goods or services. Such in-
teraction may imply the disclosure of some information related to the in-
volved users. A third party collecting such information may be able to track
users and obtain confidential data about their habits and whereabouts which
represents a serious menace. According to that, communication protocols
for MANETs must be privacy-preserving. Privacy includes anonymity and
unlinkability. Anonymity refers to the requirement that a user should be
able to participate in the network without revealing her identity. However,
anonymity must not imply impunity for dishonest users who try to disrupt
the system. Unlinkability means that different interactions between a specific
user and the network communication system cannot be related to each other
neither by the system nor by an external observer. Note that, if a system is
anonymous but the different actions by the same user are linkable, the user’s
roaming pattern can be obtained from such linkage; this might suffice to infer
the user’s identity (the roaming pattern typically includes going home, going
to a certain job location, etc.).
Due to the mobility inherent in MANETs, new applications which exploit
this property must be developed. Such new schemes must provide incentives
to the participant nodes while achieving security and privacy.
1.1.3 Information spread in VANETs
Vehicular ad hoc networks permit a vehicle to automatically warn nearby
vehicles about its movements (braking, lane change, etc.) to avert dangerous
situations. These alert messages only require a limited dissemination (less
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1.1 Situation and objectives 9
than a hundred meters) but have very strong real-time requirements (they
must be processed very quickly).
VANETs also allow a car to send announcements about road conditions
(traffic jams, accidents, icy spots) to other vehicles so that the latter can take
advantage of that information to select routes avoiding troublesome points.
Such announcement messages require a longer dissemination range. However,
their requirement of real-time processing is much less strict than in the case
of alerts, so that advanced cryptography can be used to make such messages
secure and trustworthy.
Privacy (anonymity and unlinkability) is a key aspect in vehicular ad hoc
networks. The fact that a vehicle is equipped with communication capabili-
ties should not render profiling its driver’s habits (locations visited, driving
pattern, etc.) any easier. Indeed, as noted in [Dötz06] a lot can be inferred
on the driver’s personality if the whereabouts and the driving pattern of a
car can be tracked.
Security in car-generated announcements sent over a VANET is funda-
mental. It is particularly important that the system does not permit an
intruder (external attacker) or a dishonest driver (internal attacker) to at-
tack integrity by either inserting fake announcements or modifying announce-
ments sent by others. Tampered announcements could seriously disrupt traf-
fic or cause dangerous situations for other vehicles.
Our interest in this field focuses on the design of protocols which en-
able vehicles to generate and spread announcement messages compromising
neither the privacy of the users nor the security of the network.
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1.1.4 Resource access in social networks
In some social networks, users can specify how much they trust other users
by assigning them a trust level [Ashr06, Saba06]. It is also possible to estab-
lish several types of relationships among users (for example, “colleague of”,
“friend of ”, etc.). The trust level and the type of relationship are used to
decide whether access is granted to resources and services being offered.
As pointed out in [Carm07, Mikr07], the availability of information on
relationships (trust level, relationship type) has increased with the advent
of the Semantic Web and raises privacy concerns: knowing who is trusted
by a user and to what extent discloses a lot about that user’s thoughts and
feelings. See [Barn06] for an analysis of related abuses.
These privacy issues have motivated some social networks [Face08, Vide08]
to enforce simple protection mechanisms, according to which users can decide
whether their resources and relationships should be public or restricted to
themselves and those users with whom they have a direct relationship. Unfor-
tunately, such straightforward mechanisms result in too restrictive policies.
Regarding this topic, we focus on enabling private relationships in social
networks while preserving the network functionality.
1.2 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents a state of the art of the different topics covered in this
thesis. It is divided in four main sections. The first one deals with the appli-
cation of security in many-to-one communications. The second one focuses
on secure and private information sharing in mobile ad hoc networks. The
third section reviews current work related to private and secure information
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1.2 Structure of this thesis 11
spread in VANETs. Finally, the last part of this chapter deals with privacy
issues when accessing to resources in social networks.
Chapter 3 presents our contributions to secure many-to-one symbol trans-
mission for resource-constrained devices. First, a protocol that minimizes
bandwidth usage is presented. Therefore, this proposal is useful in environ-
ments where the bandwidth is a scarce resource and it is critical to make the
most of it. Next, a protocol that offers secure many-to-one symbol transmis-
sion for sensor networks is presented. It provides an optimal message length
and the computational cost at nodes is reduced enough to work properly on
lightweight nodes. We refer to the computational capabilities on real sensor
devices to prove the deployability of this proposal in real environments.
Chapter 4 presents our contributions to information sharing in mobile ad
hoc networks. The first section presents an information system where the
information servers are static nodes and the users who request information
are mobile nodes. The main objective of such system is to give information
just in time and just in place to users in an certain urban area. A typical
application of this construction would be provision of touristic information.
The second section presents a new scheme designed to disseminate advertise-
ments through mobile ad hoc networks. This scheme exploits the capabilities
of mobile ad hoc networks to increase the visibility of the products being of-
fered by merchants. It outperforms current proposals in the literature. A new
approach to reward nodes that collaborate in the dissemination is provided
too.
In Chapter 5, our contributions to private and trustworthy informa-
tion spread in vehicular ad hoc networks are presented. More precisely, we
present a new system that provides secure vehicle-generated announcements
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on VANETs. This scheme relies on a priori measures against internal attack-
ers (vehicles in the VANET sending fake messages). It outperforms current
proposals in the literature. Regarding privacy, three different variants of the
system are proposed to achieve privacy without losing trustworthiness. The
feasibility of this scheme is studied using simulations.
Chapter 6 presents our contributions to private resource access in social
networks. More specifically, we present a new protocol which offers private
relationships allowing resource access through indirect relationships without
requiring a mediating trusted third party (although an optimistic trusted
third party is used which only acts in case of conflict). This scheme addresses
the functionality and privacy drawbacks found in current proposals in the
literature. Empirical evidence is provided about the proposed protocol being
scalable and deployable in practical social networks.
The concluding remarks and a summary of the results presented in this
thesis can be found in Chapter 7. Some guidelines for future research are
given in that chapter as well.
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State of the Art
In this chapter, we present the state of art of the different topics covered in
our research. This chapter will serve as a basis to identify unsolved subjects
that will be later addressed in this thesis.
2.1 Many-to-one information transmission
As stated in [Wolf03], the solution to implosion in many-to-one scenarios
is obtained by intermediate routers combining received messages into a sin-
gle message that is routed towards the base station (the root of the tree).
This process is called aggregation. The authors in [Wolf03] present a gen-
eral framework for scalable many-to-one communication where intermediate
nodes collect messages from their children, aggregate them and send a single
aggregated message up to their parent. In this way, the base station receives
a single message containing all the readings from the leaves. This solution is
scalable (permitting an unlimited amount of senders) as long as aggregated
data do not grow in size. Two scenarios are then possible:
• Lossy aggregation. In this case, the message output by aggregation
13
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14 State of the Art
contains less information than the set of messages input to aggregation.
Thus, the size of the output can stay the same as the size of each input.
Some examples of lossy data aggregation are:
– If data is a temperature, different temperatures can be aggregated
by computing their average. Information loss comes from the fact
that the base station will not know the temperature obtained by
each node but only the average of all readings.
– If data is a counter, different counters can be aggregated by addi-
tion. Information loss comes from the base station not being able
to find out the exact contribution by each node.
– If data sent is a binary value indicating an alarm, it can be aggre-
gated using a logical OR operation. The base station will know
an alarm has been raised but not its exact origin.
On the whole, lossy approaches can not be used in scenarios where the
root must know the specific data sent by each leaf.
• Lossless aggregation. This situation occurs when no information loss
is affordable during aggregation. It happens in applications where the
root multicasts a data request to the leaves and the leaves react by
sending one q-ary symbol each (data sent by each leaf can be modeled
as an integer ranging from 1 to q). At the end of the process, the
root knows which symbol was transmitted by each leaf. In this case,
the only possibility left is for leaves to use a message length such that
all information they transmit can be aggregated in a single message
of that length (the message reaching the root). This implies that the
actual informational content transmitted by leaves will be less than the
bitlength of the messages they use.
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The framework presented in [Wolf03] works fine in these two scenarios.
However, it does not address security. This fact represents a major drawback
which disqualifies it when security requirements arise.
Some proposals for secure many-to-one communications in both scenar-
ios exist in the literature. We summarize them in the following two sub-
sections: Secure many-to-one lossy transmission and Secure many-to-one
lossless transmission.
2.1.1 Secure many-to-one lossy transmission
Few researchers have proposed solutions which provide security in this kind
of lossy communications. In [Przy03] the authors present a framework for de-
signing secure data aggregation protocols. They propose concrete protocols
within this framework for securely computing the median, securely finding
the minimum and maximum values, securely estimating the network size and
securely computing the average of measurements. This framework assumes
the existence of special nodes called aggregators which receive the readings
from the sensor nodes and aggregate them. The authors state that a user
can verify that a certain aggregation given by an aggregator is a good ap-
proximation of the true value even when such aggregator and a fraction of
the sensor nodes are corrupted. However, there are some shortcomings in
this framework:
• It only offers data confidentiality against external attackers eavesdrop-
ping the path from a particular sensor node to the aggregator. Since
aggregators must know the sensor readings that they are aggregat-
ing and their sources, when an aggregator becomes compromised, the
confidentiality of all the messages which traverse such node becomes
compromised too.
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• The framework presented in [Przy03] is designed to work with only
one aggregator. The authors admit that in case of too large a sen-
sor network, an aggregator alone may not be capable of handling the
whole network. In this case, they propose to use several aggregators
to perform a process named hierarchical aggregation. Even though this
solution works with some functions like Min/Max and average compu-
tation, there are other functions which can not be treated in this way.
The authors leave the research on new aggregation types as future work.
• This proposal assumes that a static network is used. Sensor nodes and
aggregators share preloaded secret keys and they must be deployed in a
deterministic way. Therefore, this framework is not feasible in scenarios
where the nodes are randomly deployed.
In [Jadi04] the authors present a secure aggregation protocol that pro-
vides confidentiality as well as integrity guarantees. This protocol aggregates
encrypted data directly, without requiring decryption at intermediate nodes.
This preserves the confidentiality of the data while they traverse the network
towards the base station. However, this protocol only enables the intermedi-
ate nodes to compute an addition of the received sensor readings. Therefore,
such a protocol is unsuitable for certain kinds of queries like Min/Max. The
authors leave this issue as part of their future work. Besides, the authors
admit that a collusion by a certain parent and one of its child nodes can
misrepresent the readings of the whole subtree without being detected. In
addition to that, the presented protocol does not work in scenarios where the
nodes are randomly deployed.
[Dimi05] and [Dimi06] deal with how to set up the network when the
sensor nodes are deployed randomly. Even though they incentivize the use of
aggregation in intermediate nodes, such proposals do not present any concrete
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protocols to aggregate the sensor readings and the author leaves this as an
open issue.
2.1.2 Secure many-to-one lossless transmission
Regarding security in many-to-one lossless communications. There are some
schemes in the literature which address this scenario. Such proposals can
be divided into two categories described below: secure acknowledgment and
secure symbol transmission.
Secure acknowledgement
These schemes provide the root with an undeniable and unforgeable proof
that a certain set of leaves have received a specific content. The information
sent by the leaves to the root is unary in the sense that, after receiving a
piece of data, every leaf will either respond with a positive acknowledgement
(a digital signature) in case of correct reception or will stay silent otherwise.
The systems proposed in [Nico04] and [Cast05] fall into this category.
The former uses the multisignature scheme in [Bold03] constructed over a
Gap Diffie-Hellman group (GDH) [Bone01]. The latter is a construction
whose security rests on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Both
solutions provide non-repudiation and are scalable (O(n) message length) as
long as the set of acknowledging leaves remains stable.
These systems only provide non-repudiation; other security properties
are not addressed. For instance, the root is unable to distinguish a voluntary
non-transmission from malicious erasure of acknowledgements by intruders.
The authors in [Nico04] and [Cast05] leave this issue for future work. Thus,
integrity is not ensured. Confidentiality is not achieved either since any
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intruder listening to the communication can ascertain which leaves are ac-
knowledging and which are not.
Secure symbol transmission
Such schemes assume a tree communication model where the root multicasts
a data request to the leaves. Upon reception of this request, the leaves react
by sending one q-ary symbol each. These messages will be aggregated by
intermediate nodes. From the received message, the root will obtain the
symbol sent by each leaf.
It can be proven that symbols sent by n leaves can not be aggregated
in a message whose length is below O(n) when all symbols have the same
probability of being sent. Current research in secure symbol transmission
focuses on designing systems whose actual length of messages is as short as
possible (within the O(n) length class). Note that this fact does not permit
an unlimited amount of senders.
In [Domi04] the authors propose a system using super-increasing se-
quences and additive privacy homomorphisms. The length of messages is
O(n), where n is the number of leaves of the multicast tree. If implemented
using the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem [Okam98] for binary transmis-
sions the message length asymptotically tends to 6n. The scheme is easily
extensible to accommodate q-ary alphabets with message length tending to
3tn (where q ≤ 2t − 1).
The proposal in [Sebe07a] reduces the message length with respect to the
scheme presented in [Domi04] for biased binary communication –i.e., where
the probability of leaves transmitting a ’1’ symbol is less than the probability
of their transmitting a ’0’ symbol. This scheme offers an O(k log k log n)
message length with n being the number of leaves and k being an upper
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
2.1 Many-to-one information transmission 19
bound on the number of leaves that wish to transmit simultaneously the
least likely symbol. Both systems provide confidentiality, authentication and
integrity. Non-repudiation is not provided.
In spite of their bandwidth efficiency, both proposals present a high
computational cost. Both use additive public-key privacy homomorphisms,
whose cleartext message length grows like O(n) for [Domi04] and grows like
O(k log k log n) for [Sebe07a]. The costly cryptographic operations on long
messages required by these schemes render them ill-suited for implementation
on resource-limited hardware like the sensor nodes used in sensor networks.
Regarding integrity, both systems permit data corruption to be detected
but identifying the corrupting nodes is not straightforward. This must be
done using a tracing procedure described in [Sebe07a] (which can also be ap-
plied for [Domi04]) in which the root traces and identifies corrupting nodes.
In Section 3.1 a scalable tree-based protocol for secure many-to-one sym-
bol transmission is proposed. This protocol saves more bandwidth and it is
computationally simpler than previous proposals in the literature. However,
this new scheme is still not enough lightweight to work properly in sensor
nodes. Section 3.2 presents a new protocol for secure many-to-one symbol
transmission in which nodes are only required to perform very simple opera-
tions. This makes it suitable for implementation in resource-constrained sce-
narios such as sensor networks. Both new schemes provide their own methods
designed to identify the corrupting nodes when data corruption is detected.
Such procedures are more efficient than the one presented in [Sebe07a] for
this purpose.
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2.2 Information sharing in MANETs
As stated previously, successful information sharing models in MANETs must
address issues related to data eavesdropping, data tampering, packet drop-
ping and selfish behaviour. The first three attacks can be addressed by ap-
plying cryptography-based secure communications. The last one is addressed
by giving incentives to the collaborative nodes of the network. In addition
to that, communication protocols for MANETs must be privacy-preserving.
Provision of incentives while offering security and privacy to the users is a
challenging task.
We next introduce the existing proposals in the literature regarding pri-
vacy, security and incentives in MANETs.
2.2.1 Privacy, security and incentives
Preservation of user privacy sometimes contradicts security requirements.
For example, a system offering services needs users to authenticate themselves
to be sure it will receive a correct payback. Another example occurs when a
certain user has an inappropriate behavior in the network. The system has
to identify the intruder in order to take proper measures. Measures to secure
these situations may affect the user’s privacy.
In [News04] a system is proposed where all nodes are registered. As a
result, the system is secure against external or internal attackers but this
approach does not respect the privacy of the users.
User authentication and privacy in MANETs are addressed in [Weim04].
In this work the authors present a protocol that allows nodes in a MANET
to recognize each other when meeting again. This scheme provides provably
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secure authentication against passive adversaries and secure message authen-
tication against active adversaries. Besides, it provides privacy while keeping
immutable and non-migratable identities. The shortcoming of this proposal
is that users can freely change their identities, which can be exploited by dis-
honest users to disrupt the system. Therefore, this protocol is not suitable
for real environments with active adversaries.
Privacy issues become worse when incentives should be given to the col-
laborative nodes of the network. As stated in [Vass03], the motivation of
users to participate is a crucial factor for the success of a system designed
for wireless ad hoc networks. However, providing motivation to nodes who
offer services to other users implies the need for a secure and private way for
collecting the rewards from the served users.
Secure electronic payment is a profusely studied research topic. From
electronic money to e-coupons [Blun05], there are several electronic payment
methods suitable for mobile devices. Nevertheless, for the specific case of
secure and private incentive-based schemes, the literature is rather scarce.
[Raja05] and [Vish03] propose incentive-based schemes where the net-
work nodes have an account and the content provider gives them credit de-
pending on the information they have uploaded. The network nodes can use
their credit to increase their download rate or change it for money. Nonethe-
less, these proposals are not designed for a mobile ad hoc network, and the
security is only focused toward the protection of the copyrighted content.
Thus, the credit of the network node can be tampered with. In addition to
that, privacy issues are not considered.
In [Pan07], the authors propose a lightweight and cheat-resistant micro-
payment scheme to stimulate and compensate collaborative peers that sacri-
fice their resources to relay packets for other peers. This scheme focuses on
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
22 State of the Art
providing a secure and stable channel to exchange data between two peers
within an ad hoc network. Intermediate nodes are incentivized to keep this
channel operative. Even though this proposal provides security to informa-
tion provision services in MANETs, it does not preserve the privacy of the
users. A certain node involved in this scheme relies on its identity to receive
information and communicate with other peers. In addition to that, its iden-
tity is related to its reputation (e.g. cooperativeness in relaying) and wealth
(e.g. collected credits for its cooperation) in the system. If a peer is found
to be malicious, either persistently or opportunistically, such node can be
excluded from the system by identity blacklisting.
A different method for sharing information in MANETs is introduced
in [Stra04]. In this work, the authors present AdPASS. This is a new sys-
tem to disseminate information in MANETs exploiting the mobility prop-
erty inherent in this kind of networks. The authors focus their work in an
M-commerce1 application which spreads digital advertisements among inter-
ested users present in a MANET. Each user specifies her interests in a profile
that is stored in her mobile device. When a certain user gets an adver-
tisement of another user’s interest, she spreads it every time she finds new
interested users around. If a customer uses the acquired advertisement to
buy something in the source shop, all the users who have cooperated in the
dissemination of the advertisement will receive some bonus. Such bonus can
later be exchanged by goods in the source shop. Even though this scheme
is supposed to provide security and privacy to the users who disseminate
advertisements, it is weak against dishonest nodes which cooperate to steal
bonuses from other users. Another shortcoming of this proposal is that the
1M-commerce stands for electronic trading of goods and services made through mobile
devices.
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authors only explain how to get the bonus points but they do not mention
how such points are later spent. This issue must be addressed since privacy
could be compromised at this point. Besides, this approach requires the
users to register themselves to a trusted authority named mediator which
acts as anonymizer and keeps track of the user’s accumulated bonus points.
We claim that a system which is designed to work in MANETs should not
require the presence of a trusted third party (TTP).
In addition to that, the bonus points scheme in AdPASS offers no guaran-
tees of fairness: even though a reasonable behavior can be expected, the fact
is that each user disseminating an advertisement can take as many points as
she wishes, regardless of how many she actually deserves. Worse yet, collu-
sions are conceivable where colluders exclude other users from dissemination
in order to monopolize bonus points. AdPASS must definitely be repaired
to thwart those roguish attitudes. Last but not least, the total number of
bonus points assigned by the merchant to an advertisement is a de facto
upper bound on the number of feasible transfers to new disseminators: due
to the limited range of MANET nodes, this implies some limitation in the
geographical dissemination range and the sales potential.
On the whole, several proposals in the literature use incentives to avoid
node misbehavior. However, applying privacy and security to incentivized
information sharing in mobile ad hoc networks has not been investigated
enough.
In Section 4.1 an architecture for a peer-to-peer mobile ad hoc network
offering distributed information provision is presented. The proposed archi-
tecture is specified as a protocol suite taking security, privacy and incentive
aspects into account. Section 4.2 describes a secure and private scheme to
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disseminate advertisements in mobile ad hoc networks where collaborating
nodes are incentivized by giving them e-coins.
2.3 Information spread in VANETs
As explained later, VANETs demand protocols which enable vehicles to gen-
erate and spread announcement messages without compromising the privacy
of the users nor the security of the network.
Security against insertion of fake announcements by external attackers
is easy to achieve using well-known cryptographic authentication techniques
(digital signatures or message authentication codes). Such techniques require
the sender of a message to access some secret key material only available to
legitimate, registered users —and therefore unavailable to external attackers.
Dealing with internal attackers is a thornier issue. The reason is that
legitimate system users, and thus internal attackers, have access to the secret
key material required to send authenticated fake messages (for instance, to
announce a false traffic jam with the aim of diverting traffic from a certain
area where some kind of crime is being committed). Countermeasures against
fake messages from internal attackers fall into two classes: a posteriori and
a priori.
2.3.1 A posteriori countermeasures against fake mes-
sages
A posteriori countermeasures consist of taking punitive actions against users
who have been proven to have originated fake messages (e.g. the offenders
can be banished from the network). These countermeasures in anonymous
systems require the presence of a trusted third party able to revoke the key
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material of such dishonest users. In this way, they will be excluded from the
system.
Digital signatures have been extensively used in most of the protocols that
offer a posteriori countermeasures: from plain digital signatures [Raya06a,
Raya07a, Raya07b, Armk07] until more sophisticated distributed signatures,
such as group signatures in [Guo07] or ring signatures in [Lin07]. The latter
paper and [Gama06] also consider ID-based ring signatures.
2.3.2 A priori countermeasures against fake messages
A priori countermeasures attempt to prevent the generation of fake messages.
In this approach, a message is not considered valid unless it has been endorsed
by a number of vehicles above a certain threshold. Those vehicles must be
in a position to confirm what is reported in the message: for a traffic jam
announcement, other jammed vehicles are potential endorsers (automatically
or after intervention of their drivers); for an ”icy road” message, nearby
vehicles whose traction system has detected slippery ground can be automatic
endorsers. This approach is based on the assumption that most users are
honest so that they will not endorse any message containing false data.
Under this approach, the risk that a collusion of dishonest vehicles reaches
the size necessary to generate fake messages always exists. The natural strat-
egy against collusions is to choose a threshold sufficiently high so as to render
successful collusions unlikely. However, this threshold should not be so high
that it prevents honest vehicles from sending true announcements in situa-
tions with a low density of vehicles.
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The a priori approach is compatible with driver privacy: since false an-
nouncements are thwarted without resorting to punitive actions, uncondi-
tional vehicle anonymity is allowable (in contrast, a posteriori countermea-
sures assume that offenders are identified and punished).
The use of a honest majority to prevent generation of fake messages has
previously been proposed in [Goll04, Parn05, Oste07, Raya06b]. A brief
discussion of those papers is next given.
In [Goll04] a framework is presented to validate received data in VANETs.
In this approach, a vehicle receives alerts from different neighbors and com-
pares them in order to infer the correctness of a certain event. This scheme
suffers from high communication overhead due to the lack of aggregation
techniques. Besides, the proposed framework has not been empirically tested.
The paper [Parn05] presents a contribution that remains quite vague: VANET
security issues are identified, some security primitives are enumerated, but
no complete protocol is actually described. In [Oste07], a system that eval-
uates the plausibility of received danger warnings is proposed. This system
estimates the trustworthiness of a reported hazard by taking a vote on the
received danger messages. The paper provides a simulative analysis of dif-
ferent voting schemes, but privacy remains unaddressed and security is not
completely covered. Finally, [Raya06b] describes a detailed protocol deploy-
able in real VANET environments (the authors show this via simulation)
which systematically deals with security threats and reduces communication
overhead by aggregating messages.
According to the above discussion, [Raya06b] seems the most competitive
scheme in the literature on the a priori approach, so we concentrate on it in
what follows. That paper presents three variants offering a priori counter-
measures against fake messages: concatenated signatures, onion signatures
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and hybrid signatures.
In the variant based on concatenated signatures, a vehicle generates an
announcement and sends it, its signature and its public-key certificate to a
nearby car which will endorse it by computing its own signature on it. This
new signature and the corresponding public-key certificate will be appended
to the frame that will be retransmitted to the next vehicle. An announcement
is considered valid after it has been endorsed by at least the number of
vehicles determined by the threshold. This approach has several drawbacks:
• It does not offer unlinkability since different signatures made by the
same user can be linked through the public key that verifies them.
Anonymity is however feasible by using pseudonyms.
• Announcement generation is delayed due to the sequential communi-
cation pattern (the delay is proportional to the number of endorsing
vehicles).
• It requires the verifier to check several signatures upon receiving an an-
nouncement (as many verifications as vehicles have endorsed the mes-
sage). These verifications involve checking the validity of public-key
certificates and probably revocation lists as well.
Therefore, there is room for improvement both in terms of privacy and effi-
ciency (communication and computation costs).
The variants based on onion signatures and hybrid signatures are similar
and designed to reduce the overall message length. Both variants use the
so-called oversignatures: instead of appending its signature, each new en-
dorsing car signs the signature by the previous endorsing car (this is called
oversigning). In an oversignature, a verifier can check the last endorser’s
signature, but not the signatures by the previous endorsers. Since this is a
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serious design flaw, we will only consider the concatenated signatures variant
for comparison in the rest of this paper.
In Section 5.2 a new scheme is presented following the a priori protection
paradigm that reduces the verification cost of endorsed messages to one signa-
ture verification. In this proposal, vehicles volunteering to generate and/or
endorse trustworthy announcements do not have to sacrifice their privacy
(anonymity and unlinkability).
2.4 Resource access in social networks
In the introduction of this thesis, we have pointed the existence of some social
networks [Face08, Vide08] which use too restrictive protection mechanisms to
preserve their users’ privacy when performing a resource access. Nonetheless,
those are not the only proposals in the literature which address this topic.
In [Carm06], a more flexible access control scheme is described, whereby
a requestor can be authorized to access a resource even if he has no direct
relationship with the resource owner, but he is within a specified depth in
the relationship graph. Access rules are used, which specify the set of access
conditions under which a certain resource can be accessed. Access conditions
are a function of the relationship type, depth and trust level. Relationship
certificates based on symmetric-key cryptography are used by a requestor to
prove that he satisfies some specific access conditions. To access resources
held by a node with whom the requestor has no direct relationship, the
requestor retrieves from a central node the chain of relationship certificates
along the path from the resource owner to himself. Clearly, the central node
is a trusted third party, as it knows the relationships of all nodes in the
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
2.4 Resource access in social networks 29
network.
In [Wang06] a mechanism to protect personal information in social net-
works is described where nodes in the network are anonymous and cannot be
linked to specific users; in contrast, the data and the relationships are public,
which might facilitate user re-identification.
An innovative privacy-preserving approach is described in [Carm07] which
leans on the access model in [Carm06] and focuses on relationship protec-
tion: a user can keep private that he has a relationship of a given type and
trust level with another user. Relationship certificates are encrypted and are
treated like a resource in their own right: access to a certificate is granted
using a distribution rule for that certificate, where the distribution condi-
tions to be satisfied by users wishing to access the certificate are specified.
If a user satisfies the distribution rule for a certificate, he receives the cor-
responding symmetric certificate key allowing him to decrypt the certificate.
In [Carm07] a rather complex scheme is proposed to manage and distribute
certificate keys. Encrypted certificates are stored at a central node; due to
encryption, the central node does not have access to the cleartext certificates,
so it does not need to be trusted in this respect. However, the central node
needs to be trusted in the following aspects:
• Trust level computation when several relationship certificates are chained
(indirect relationship between a resource requestor and a resource owner).
• Certificate revocation enforcement when a relationship ceases to exist
(the central node must maintain a certificate revocation list and inform
the other nodes about new revocations).
In [Domi07] a protocol is proposed which overcomes the shortcomings
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detected in [Carm07]. Specifically, the author presents a public-key proto-
col which achieves relationship protection without the presence of a central
node working as trusted third party. In addition to that, this protocol avoids
revealing the content of relationships to the resource requestor and substan-
tially simplifies relationship revocation. Nevertheless, this scheme has some
shortcomings that we next summarize:
• For each resource access, a user tries to get the backing of the nodes
with whom he is related. If a related node is temporarily unreachable
or refuses to collaborate, it is hoped that other nodes related to the
requestor will be available to act as intermediate nodes. However, a
user with a small number of relations is likely to stay isolated at certain
periods of time (e.g. early in the morning). This issue is an open
problem which must be addressed.
• The protocol in [Domi07] prevents the resource requestor from seeing
any of the relationship certificates that will be used by the resource
owner to decide whether the requestor is granted access. However, the
resource owner learns the relationships, and their trust level, between
the users who collaborate in the resource access. This represents a ma-
jor privacy toll which would justify that some intermediate nodes might
refuse collaboration. This fact also has implications for the previous
point explained above: nodes which refuse to collaborate add to nodes
which are unreachable and both categories disrupt in the same way the
normal network operation.
In Section 6.2 a new protocol for resource access in social networks is
presented. This proposal offers the same features of [Carm07] and [Domi07]
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
2.4 Resource access in social networks 31
while providing a solution which addresses the drawbacks left open in [Domi07].
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In Section 2.1 we pointed out the need to design efficient protocols providing
secure many-to-one symbol transmission for sensor networks. In this chapter,
we present our contributions to this field.
Sensor networks are formed by devices with limited computational ca-
pabilities and limited battery power. Therefore, this kind of networks need
protocols which provide reduced bandwidth usage and low computational
cost at the sensor nodes.
Section 3.1 presents a scheme for many-to-one symbol transmission that
has been published in [Sebe07b]. It provides an optimal message length. In
this way, bandwidth usage is reduced to the minimum. According to that,
this proposal is useful in environments where the bandwidth is a scarce re-
source and it is critical to make the most of it. It also provides immediate
detection of corrupted messages. This scheme uses multisignatures over Gap
33
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Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups [Bold03]. Note that these cryptographic oper-
ations may not be suitable for implementation in resource-limited networks
like sensor networks.
Section 3.2 presents the first proposal in the literature that offers secure
many-to-one symbol transmission for sensor networks. It has been published
in [Viej08]. This scheme is based on [Sebe07b]. It also provides an optimal
message length but replaces the use of GDH cryptography with hash func-
tions. In this way, computational cost at nodes is reduced. As a result, this
proposal is suitable for resource-constrained devices, which are quite com-
mon in sensor networks. This scheme does not permit immediate detection
of corrupted messages. This detection is performed using an a posteriori
tracing algorithm.
3.1 Secure many-to-one communications based
on GDH multisignatures
In this section, we introduce a scalable and secure protocol for many-to-one
symbol transmission that offers an optimal message length and is computa-
tionally simpler than previous proposals in the literature [Domi04, Sebe07a].
In addition to that, nodes can immediately check the correctness of received
messages and detect data corruption without requiring any extra error trac-
ing procedure. In previous proposals, message corruption was detected by
the root of the tree communication model. Identification of dishonest nodes
was done using a tracing algorithm. Last but not least, computational cost
at nodes is lower than in previous proposals. This is proven in Section 3.1.5.
As stated previously, the construction we present uses multisignatures
over a Gap Diffie-Hellman group [Bold03]. Next, we briefly introduce its
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mathematical background. Later, we describe our protocol in detail.
3.1.1 Multisignatures over Gap Diffie-Hellman groups
A Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group G is an algebraic group of prime order q
for which no efficient algorithm can compute gab for random ga, gb ∈ G, but
such that there exists an efficient algorithm D(ga, gb, h) to decide whether
h = gab. Let 1G be the neutral element of G. GDH groups are suitable
for public-key cryptography. The secret key is a random value x ∈ Zq and
its corresponding public key is y ← gx. The signature on a message m is
computed as σ ←H(m)x (H is a cryptographic one-way hash function). The
validity of a signature can be tested by checking D(y,H(m), σ).
GDH groups are convenient to compute multisignatures. Given two sig-
natures of the same message m under two different public keys y1, y2, a
signature of m under the combined public key y ← y1y2 = g(x1+x2) can be
obtained as H(m)x1H(m)x2 = H(m)x1+x2 .
3.1.2 General assumptions
Our protocol assumes a tree communication model in which the the root
is the final receiver, internal tree nodes are reverse multicast routers and
the leaves correspond to senders. The root S has a private key xS and its
corresponding public key yS ← gxS . This public key is accepted by all the
nodes in the tree. Each leaf Ui has several private/public key pairs. The
public keys are accepted as valid by intermediate routers and the root. Each
node in the multicast tree knows its parent node and the public keys of nodes
belonging to the subtree rooted at it. Each node also knows the public key
of the root.
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3.1.3 Reverse bit transmission
In this section we detail our proposal for binary communication, where each
leaf Ui transmits a “0” or “1” bit (denoted by bi). We assume the multicast
tree contains n leaves Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each leaf Ui has two secret keys xi,a and
xi,b. Its corresponding public keys are yi,a ← gxi,a and yi,b ← gxi,b. We also
require each leaf Ui to share a secret key Ki with the root. This value can be
agreed upon by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In this way,
leaf Ui obtains Ki from one of its private keys and the root’s public key, that
is, Ki = (yS)
xi,a; the root can also obtain Ki by computing Ki = (yi,a)
xS .
The protocol works as follows:
1. Challenge. The root multicasts to the leaves a challenge consisting
of a random value v (v may include a description on the requested
information).
2. Message generation.
(a) Upon receiving v, each leaf Ui computes a pseudo-random bit
ci ← lsb1(H(v||Ki)), where lsb1(·) is a function returning the least
significant bit of its argument.
(b) If ci ⊕ bi = 1 then Ui computes σi := H(v)xi,a.
If ci ⊕ bi = 0 then Ui computes σi := H(v)xi,b.
(c) If ci ⊕ bi = 1 then Ui generates a 2n-bit sequence Ii so that its
2i-th bit is “1”. The rest of bits are set to “0”.
If ci ⊕ bi = 0 then Ui generates a 2n-bit sequence Ii so that its
(2i− 1)-th bit is “1”. The rest of bits are set to “0”.
(d) Ui sends the pair (Ii, σi) up to its parent node.
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3. Message aggregation. An intermediate router R or the root S
receives messages from its child routers/leaves and does the following:
(a) For each received pair (Ij , σj):
i. Let i := 1. Let y := 1G.
ii. While i ≤ n loop
• If Ij [2i] = 1 and Ij [2i− 1] = 0 then y := y · yi,a
• If Ij [2i] = 0 and Ij [2i− 1] = 1 then y := y · yi,b
• If Ij [2i] = 1 and Ij [2i− 1] = 1 then ERROR 1
• i := i + 1
iii. It checks D(y,H(v), σj). If this check fails, then ERROR.
(b) Once all expected messages {(Ij, σj)}j have been received and
checked (for the sake of simplicity, we describe the protocol assum-
ing no errors were found), R or S aggregate them by computing
I =
∨
j Ij (∨ denotes the bit-wise OR operation) and σ =
∏
j σj .
(c) If the aggregating node is an intermediate node R, it sends (I, σ)
up to its parent node. Else, if it is the root S this is the final
aggregated message.
4. Symbol extraction. From the final aggregated message (I, σ), the
root S obtains the bit sent by each leaf as follows:
(a) Let i := 1
(b) While i ≤ n loop
• Compute ci ← lsb1(H(v||Ki))
• If I[2i] = 1 and I[2i− 1] = 0 then di := 1 and bi := di ⊕ ci
1Section 3.1.6 describes how to handle erroneous situations.
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• If I[2i] = 0 and I[2i− 1] = 1 then di := 0 and bi := di ⊕ ci
• If I[2i] = 0 and I[2i− 1] = 0 then bi := NULL
• i := i + 1
(c) Return B = (b1, . . . , bn)
Note. No verification of the signature σ is needed during the extraction
step, because σ is the aggregation of signatures σj which have been verified
at each aggregation step (in the last aggregation step, verification has been
carried out by the root itself).
3.1.4 Security analysis
We next analyze how our proposal provides confidentiality, authentication,
integrity and non-repudiation.
Confidentiality
The confidentiality property refers to the fact that only the root should be
able to obtain vector B = (b1, . . . , bn) containing the bit transmitted by each
leaf. An intruder eavesdropping messages of the form (I, σ) can determine
for each leaf Ui located below the sniffing point in the tree whether the leaf
transmitted σi = H(v)xi,a, σi = H(v)xi,b or did not transmit by observing I
(exactly the bits at I[2i] and I[2i− 1]).
From knowledge of σi the intruder is able to determine ci ⊕ bi. But since
ci is only known to Ui and the root (it is computed from the challenge v
and the shared secret key Ki), nobody but them is able to determine the
transmitted value bi.
Note that an intruder can determine which leaves did not transmit. In
applications where this fact causes information leakage, non-transmission
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should not be permitted.
Authentication
This property requires that intruders cannot generate false messages that
will be accepted as valid by the system. The creation of a message that will
be accepted as authentic coming from Ui requires knowledge of its private
key xi,a or xi,b. This is because the message sent by Ui includes a signature
σi over H(v) computed from xi,a or xi,b. As long as secret keys are not
compromised and the signature scheme is unforgeable (a valid signature can
only be computed if the secret is known) the system provides authentication.
The use of a different challenge v at each execution prevents replay attacks.
Integrity
This property requires being able to detect substitution or suppression of
messages by an intruder. Given a message (I, σ), the field σ is a multisig-
nature on H(v). Without loss of generality, let us take the case of a leaf Ui
whose message has been aggregated into (I, σ) and assume that Ui transmit-
ted σi = H(v)xi,a. Further, assume that the value σi = H(v)xi,a is known to
an attacker who could have obtained it by capturing the first message sent
by Ui.
An attacker wishing to replace Ui’s contribution with σ
′
i = H(v)xi,b needs
to replace σ with σ′ so that σ′ = σH(v)xi,b (H(v)xi,a)−1. If this was possible,
an attacker able to compute σ′ would get H(v)xi,b := σ′σi
σ
which is a signature
on H(v) which would be validated using the public key yi,b. This would
contradict the unforgeability property of the GDH signature. In this sense,
the system provides integrity against malicious alteration of the value bi sent
by a given leaf.
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An intermediate node could dishonestly decide to suppress and not ag-
gregate a message received from some of its child nodes. This fact would
be interpreted by the root as a non-transmission. Also, the contribution by
Ui could be suppressed by an attacker who knew the value σi (H(v)xi,a or
H(v)xi,b). This can be done by computing σ′ = σ(σi)−1 (the corresponding
alteration of I is trivial).
In order to avoid these suppression attacks, the protocol should not per-
mit non-transmissions. In this way, if the root gets nothing from a leaf, a
suppression attack is signalled.
Non-repudiation
This property requires that no leaf be able to deny having sent a given
value that has been received by the root. A valid message (I, σ) reaching
the root contains a value σ that is a multisignature on H(v). The non-
repudiation property of the multisignature scheme guarantees that each leaf
having contributed to the signature cannot deny having signed under the
private key corresponding to one of its two public keys yi,a or yi,b. Therefore,
a leaf Ui cannot repudiate the value ci⊕bi she sent. Deriving non-repudiation
on bi from ci ⊕ bi requires prior declaration by Ui of the procedure used to
obtain ci. This procedure must be later reconstructable in front of a third
party.
3.1.5 Performance analysis
Performance will be analyzed in terms of message length and computational
cost. We compare our protocol with [Domi04]. On the other hand, [Sebe07a]
is not included in this comparison because it was designed for biased scenarios
and we are focused on non-biased scenarios.
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Message length
In our proposal, the length of messages stays constant in the way from the
leaves towards the root. A message consists of the pair (I, σ). The bitlength
of component I is 2n (being n the number of leaves) while the component
σ is a multisignature constructed over a Gap Diffie-Hellman group [Bone01].
This group can be constructed over non-supersingular elliptic curves to get a
bitlength of approximately 170 bits which provides a security level similar to
320-bit DSA signatures or 1024-bit RSA signatures [Bone01]. Thus, messages
have a bitlength 2n + O(1). For large values of n, this length tends asymp-
totically to 2n. This improves on the message length offered by [Domi04],
which tends asymptotically to 6n.
Computational cost
The calculations performed by the protocol can be classified into four cat-
egories: message generation, message verification, message aggregation and
data extraction. We next quantify the computation in each category.
Generation. Generation of (Ii, σi) by leaf Ui takes time O(n) to generate the
binary sequence Ii plus the time to compute the signature σi. Since this
latter time does not depend on n, we take it as O(1) in our analysis.
Verification. An intermediate node receives and checks messages {(Ij, σj)}j
from its child nodes. For each (Ij , σj), the node computes y and then
checks the validity of the multisignature σj . Computation of y requires
one operation over the GDH group for each leaf that contributed to the
message. The verification time of the signature does not depend on n,
so we take it O(1). Since there are O(n) leaves in the tree, the overall
amount of multiplications spent by one node computing the y’s for all
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{(Ij, σj)}j is at most O(n). The amount of signatures to be verified
depends on the number of child nodes of the intermediate router. In
any case, this amount cannot grow faster than O(n).
Aggregation. Aggregation of {(Ij, σj)}j into (I, σ) requires at most O(n)
bitwise OR operations over O(n)-long messages during the computa-
tion of I and at most O(n) operations (each one with cost O(1)) over
the GDH group to compute the new multisignature. This results in a
maximal O(n2) cost.
Extraction. Finally, the extraction of vector B = (b1, . . . , bn) by the root
node is done by processing component I in time O(n).
Table 3.1 compares our system with respect to [Domi04]. The cubic cost
(O(n3)) of message generation and data extraction in [Domi04] is due to the
encryption of O(n) long messages using the Okamoto-Uchiyama homomor-
phic cryptosystem.
Table 3.1: Performance comparison with [Domi04]
Our proposal [Domi04]
Message length (for n ↑↑) 2n 6n
Cost of message generation O(n) O(n3)
Cost of message aggregation O(n2) O(n3)
Cost of data extraction O(n) O(n3)
3.1.6 Error handling
Upon message reception, intermediate nodes perform several checks on the
messages (Ij, σj) received from their child nodes prior to composing the ag-
gregated message they will transmit. The checks that are always performed
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are:
• Check that Ij does not contain Ij[2i] = Ij[2i − 1] = 1 for any Ui
(message generation does not permit this situation).
• Check that multisignature σj is consistent with the aggregated public
key y computed from Ij.
If some of the above checks fail, the node will consider its sender (one of
its child nodes) liable. This is because the child node either ought to have
detected and reported these problems when performing its checks (if it was
an intermediate node) or is causing the problems itself. In particular, if the
child node is a leaf, it should have constructed an error-free message. Upon
identification of a disrupting node, appropriate measures are taken against
it (for instance, removal of the node from the multicast tree).
If non-transmission by leaves is not permitted, some additional require-
ments arise:
• First of all, an intermediate node has to receive one message (Ij, σj)
from each of its children. If some of them are missing this will be inter-
pretated as a malicious non-transmission by the corresponding children.
• Each intermediate node needs to know the list of leaves present in the
subtree rooted at each of its child nodes. When checking each message
(Ij, σj), it needs to check that all leaves present in this subtree are
contributing. If this is not the case, this node will consider its sender
child liable for having suppressed such contributions.
Note that neither the reception of a corrupted message nor a non-reception
may be caused by the sender, but by an attacker disrupting the communi-
cation link between the sender and the receiver. In any case, the receiver
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cannot distinguish between both situations. The receiver simply perceives
that messages coming from that child are not reliable any more; upon this,
the receiver can take the appropriate measures.
3.1.7 Generalization to q-ary transmission
The system can easily be generalized from binary to q-ary communications.
We will represent each symbol from the q-ary alphabet by a different integer
from the set {1, . . . , q}. First of all, the smallest integer t such that q ≤ 2t−1
is chosen. Each leaf Ui has t secret keys xi,1, . . . , xi,t, with their corresponding
public keys yi,1 ← gxi,1, . . . , yi,t ← gxi,t accepted as valid by the intermediate
routers and the root. Like in the binary protocol, the root S shares a secret
key Ki with each leaf.
The generalized protocol is as follows:
1. Challenge. The root multicasts a challenge consisting of a random
value v (v may include a description on the requested information.).
2. Message generation.
(a) Upon receiving the challenge v, each leaf Ui computes a pseudo-
random t-bit sequence (c1, . . . , ct)← lsbt(H(v||Ki)), where lsbt(·)
is a function returning the t least significant bits of its argument.
(b) Let (b1, . . . , bt) be the binary representation of the symbol to be
transmitted. Leaf Ui computes the sequence (d1, . . . , dt) by doing:
• If (b1, . . . , bt) = (c1, . . . , ct) then (d1, . . . , dt) := (b1, . . . , bt).
Else (d1, . . . , dt) := (b1 ⊕ c1, . . . , bt ⊕ ct)
(c) Ui generates a tn-bit sequence (where n is the number of leaves) Ii
and sets the bits from the subsequence ranging from the t(i−1)+1
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to the ti positions so that they match (d1, . . . , dt). The remaining
bits are set to “0”.
(d) Ui computes σi := H(v)
∑t
p=1 dp·xi,p
(e) Ui sends the pair (Ii, σi) up to its parent node
3. Message aggregation. An intermediate router R or the root S
receives messages from its child routers/leaves and does the following.
(a) For each received pair (Ij , σj):
i. Let i := 1. Let y := 1G.
ii. While i ≤ n loop
• y := y ·∏tp=1 yIj[t(i−1)+p]i,p
• i := i + 1
iii. It checks D(y,H(v), σj). If this check fails, then ERROR.
(b) Once all expected messages {(Ij , σj)}j have been received, R ag-
gregates them by computing I =
∨
j Ij (∨ denotes the bit-wise
OR operation) and σ =
∏
j σj .
(c) If R is an intermediate node, it sends (I, σ) up to its parent node.
Else, if it is the root, this is the final aggregated message.
4. Symbol extraction. From the final aggregated message (I, σ), the
root obtains the symbol sent by each leaf as follows,
(a) Let i := 1
(b) While i ≤ n loop
• Compute (c1, . . . , ct)← lsbt(H(v||Ki))
• If (I[t(i−1)+1], . . . , I[ti]) = (c1, . . . , ct) then (bi,1, . . . , bi,t) :=
(c1, . . . , ct)
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• Else (bi,1, . . . , bi,t) := (I[t(i− 1) + 1]⊕ c1, . . . , I[ti]⊕ ct)
• i := i + 1
(c) Return B = ((b1,1, . . . , b1,t), . . . , (bn,1, . . . , bn,t)), where (bi,1, . . . , bi,t)
is the binary representation of the symbol transmitted by Ui.
The security and cost analysis of this extension is not included since it
would be done in the same manner described for the binary protocol. In this
case, the message length tends asymptotically to tn.
Note that Step 2b above ensures that the sequence (d1, . . . , dn) does not
have all its elements equal to 0. If this was the case, the signature σi would
equal 1 and would lose its non-repudiation and integrity properties.
3.2 Secure many-to-one communications for
resource-constrained devices
In Section 3.1, we presented [Sebe07b]. This protocol offered:
• Optimal message length.
• Lower computational cost than previous proposals in the literature.
• Immediate detection of corrupted data without requiring any extra
error tracing procedure.
However, due to the use of GDH multisignatures, such protocol may not
be adequate for resource-constrained devices.
In this section, we present a novel system for secure many-to-one symbol
transmission which provides the same message length than [Sebe07b] but
replaces the use of GDH cryptography with hash functions. This reduces the
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computational cost at nodes. According to that, such a system is suitable
for implementation in sensor networks. In addition to that, we also give
an optimization of the proposed protocol to improve the efficiency of the
message length and reduce the energy consumption at sensor nodes due to
communication.
This system does not permit immediate detection of corrupted messages
(like the previous scheme). Corrupted nodes are identified using an a pos-
teriori tracing algorithm. Note that this tracing procedure is more efficient
than the one presented in [Sebe07a].
3.2.1 General assumptions
Our protocol assumes a tree network where the root is the base station re-
ceiving data from the leaves (which may be sensor nodes). For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that only the leaves send data. Intermediate nodes
simply act as routers. Extending the proposed solution to accommodate data
transmission from intermediate nodes is straightforward.
The base station (BS) is a full-fledged computer. Leaves and intermediate
nodes are low-cost devices. The base station owns a private key SKBS. The
corresponding public key PKBS is known and accepted as valid by all nodes
in the tree. Let n be the number of leaves and Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote the
leaves. Each leaf Ui shares a secret key Ki with the base station.
3.2.2 Many-to-one q-ary transmission
We represent each symbol from the q-ary alphabet by a different integer from
the set {1, . . . , q}. Parameter t is chosen as the smallest integer satisfying
q ≤ 2t− 1. Parameter s is a security parameter (see Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5
for details about s). A protocol execution consists of the following steps:
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1. Challenge. The base station generates a random value v and signs
it to obtain {v}SKBS . The signed value is multicast by the base station
to all leaves.
2. Message generation.
(a) Upon receiving v and verifying its signature, each leaf Ui computes
a pseudo-random t-bit sequence (c1, . . . , ct)← lsbt(H(v||Ki)), where
lsbt(·) is a function returning the t least significant bits of its ar-
gument, H is a one-way hash function and || is the concatenation
operator.
(b) Each Ui computes a sequence (d1, . . . , dt) as follows. Let (b1, . . . , bt)
be the binary representation of the q-ary symbol to be transmitted
by Ui.
• If (b1, . . . , bt) = (c1, . . . , ct) then (d1, . . . , dt) := (b1, . . . , bt)
Else (d1, . . . , dt) := (b1 ⊕ c1, . . . , bt ⊕ ct)
Note that this step ensures that the sequence (d1, . . . , dt) does not
have all its elements equal to 0. This all zeroes value is reserved
to identify non-transmittal by leaves.
(c) Ui computes an s-bit pseudo-random integer σi as follows:
σi ← lsbs(H(d1, . . . , dt||v||Ki))
(d) Each Ui generates a tn-bit sequence (n is the number of leaves) Ii
and sets the bits from the subsequence between positions t(i−1)+1
and ti so that they match (d1, . . . , dt). The remaining bits are set
to “0”.
(e) Ui sends the pair (Ii, σi) up to its parent node.
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3. Message aggregation. An intermediate node R (or the base sta-
tion) receives messages from its child routers/leaves and does the fol-
lowing:
(a) Store each received pair (Ij, σj) (they may have to be checked
later).
(b) Once all expected messages {(Ij , σj)}j have been received, aggre-
gate them by computing I =
∨
j Ij (∨ denotes the bitwise OR
operation) and σ =
∑
j σj (mod 2
s).
(c) If R is not the base station, send (I, σ) up to its parent node.
Else, this is the final aggregated message.
4. Symbol extraction. From the final aggregated message (I, σ),
the base station obtains, for each leaf Ui, the binary representation
(bi,1, . . . , bi,t) of the symbol sent by the leaf. It is obtained from the se-
quence (di,1, . . . , di,t), previously generated by Ui (see Step 2b), which
is contained in I. Then the base station computes the pseudo-random
integer linked to (di,1, . . . , di,t) (see Step 2c), which will be used to
check the integrity of the whole aggregated message. We next give the
pseudo-code related to this process:
(a) Let i := 1, ω := 0.
(b) While i ≤ n loop
• Compute (c1, . . . , ct)← lsbt(H(v||Ki)).
• If (I[t(i−1)+1], . . . , I[ti]) = (c1, . . . , ct) then (bi,1, . . . , bi,t) :=
(c1, . . . , ct).
• Else (bi,1, . . . , bi,t) := (I[t(i− 1) + 1]⊕ c1, . . . , I[ti]⊕ ct).
• Compute φi ← lsbs(H(I[t(i− 1) + 1], . . . , I[ti]||v||Ki)).
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• ω := ω + φi (mod 2s).
• i := i + 1.
(c) If ω = σ then return B = ((b1,1, . . . , b1,t), . . . , (bn,1, . . . , bn,t)),
where (bi,1, . . . , bi,t) is the binary representation of the symbol
transmitted by Ui. The base station also multicasts a signed ac-
knowledgment {“Ack”||v}SKBS to the leaves. This message con-
tains the challenge v to avoid replay attacks. Upon receiving this
message, intermediate routers remove messages stored at Step 3a.
If ω 	= σ the base station launches the error-tracing procedure
detailed in Section 3.2.3.
Figure 3.1 shows the message flow generated by a protocol execution in
a simple scenario with a base station (BS), two intermediate nodes (R1 and
R2) and four leaves (U1, . . . , U4). In Figure 3.1.a the base station broadcasts
a challenge to all leaves (Step 1 in the protocol execution). In Figure 3.1.b,
message (1) sent by U1 corresponds to the pair (I1, σ1) while message (2)
sent by U2 represents the pair (I2, σ2) (Step 2 in the protocol execution).
Node R1 constructs message (3), which corresponds to (I, σ), by aggregating
messages (1) and (2) (Step 3 in the protocol execution). The same process
occurs in the subtree rooted by R2. The latter node constructs message (6) by
aggregating messages (4) and (5), which correspond to the pairs (I3, σ3) and
(I4, σ4), respectively. Eventually, the base station BS aggregates messages
(3) and (6) to get the final aggregated message. After that, BS extracts the
symbols transmitted by the leaves (Step 4 in the protocol execution).
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
















Figure 3.1: Message flow in a protocol execution
3.2.3 Procedure to deal with corrupted messages
During symbol extraction, the base station checks the integrity of the received
message. If this verification fails, the base station identifies the message as
corrupted. The following procedure allows to remove the corrupting nodes
from the tree.
1. From the received I component, the base station computes the valid σi
associated to each Ui:
(a) For i = 1 to n do
• (di,1, . . . , di,t) := (I[t(i− 1) + 1], . . . , I[ti])
• σi ← lsbs(H(di,1, . . . , di,t||v||Ki))
(b) The base station sends to all nodes the signed message
{I||σ1, . . . , σn||v}SKBS
2. Upon receiving {I||σ1, . . . , σn||v}SKBS and verifying its signature and
the value v, each intermediate node R checks each stored message
(Ij, σj) received from its children. For each (Ij , σj), R does:
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(a) For each leaf Ui with nonzero contribution to Ij (that is, (I[t(i−
1) + 1], . . . , I[ti]) 	= (0, . . . , 0)), check that the contribution to Ij
equals the contribution to I. If some of these checks fail, the
point of corruption is above R’s position and R stops the checking
procedure.
(b) Else, R computes the sum modulo 2s of the σi associated to each
Ui who contributes to Ij. If the sum is equal to σj , the child who
sent this message is considered innocent. If the result is different,
that child is considered guilty.
When a malicious node has altered a message (note that a malicious node
can corrupt a message at each protocol execution or only once in a while),
all nodes located in the path from the corruption point to the root detect
this corruption. However, the nodes detecting the corruption cannot decide
whether corruption was caused by the child who sent the corrupted message
or by another node located in the subtree rooted at this child. A simple
solution would be to delete the entire suspicious subtree. This would entail
the loss of a big part of the network due to a single corrupted message.
We propose the following procedure to minimize the number of nodes to be
eliminated:
1. The base station and all intermediate nodes have a pre-loaded integer
λ associated to each child.
• Initially, an intermediate node assigns a value λ = 1 to those of
its children that are leaves.
• If a child is an internal node, the initial assigned value corresponds
to the number of leaves in the subtree rooted at that child.
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2. When a node detects a corrupted message, it decrements the λ value
assigned to the child from which this message comes from. Note that
the λ values of all nodes located between the point of corruption and
the base station will be decremented.
3. When the λ value assigned to a child becomes zero, the node closes
communication with such a suspicious child (thus pruning the subtree
rooted at this child).
The initial value assignment ensures that a corrupted leaf is pruned the
first time it sends a bad message (λ = 1). The initial value assignment for
an internal node is done assuming that it always acts honestly so that it
only needs to be removed from the tree after all the leaves in its subtree
have already been removed (in this case no more messages will come from
its subtree). This procedure ensures that a dishonest internal node will be
removed, although not necessarily the first time it corrupts and forwards a
message.
3.2.4 Security analysis
We next explain the adversary model and the possible attacks the system has
to be robust against. We refer to those attacks to justify the security prop-
erties achieved by our scheme: confidentiality, authentication and integrity.
We also give the success probability of each possible attack.
Adversary model
Our attacker model considers an adversary who can control nodes (thus turn-
ing them into compromised nodes) and who can also access communication
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Table 3.2: Possible attacks and their success probabilities
Attack Success probability
Message eavesdropping Not possible
Leaf impersonation 1/((2t − 1)2s)
Leaf contribution alteration 1/2s
Leaf contribution removal Not possible
Message aggregation disruption Not possible
lines to capture, modify and retransmit messages. The attacker’s computa-
tional power does not permit her to break current computationally secure
cryptosystems.
We consider that an adversary can try the following attacks:
• Eavesdrop messages.
• Impersonate a certain leaf Ui.
• Alter the contribution of a certain leaf Ui.
• Remove the contribution of a certain leaf Ui.
• Disrupt the aggregation of messages received from some child nodes.
More specifically, an external attacker can try the first four attacks while
an adversary who has compromised some nodes could also try the last one.
Attacks and security properties
Table 3.2 summarizes the success probabilities of each possible attack in
scenarios where non-transmittal is disallowed. We next justify the values in
the table.
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Message eavesdropping. This attack refers to the confidentiality property.
An adversary eavesdropping messages of the form (I, σ) at some point
(called sniffing point from now on) in the communication tree can dis-
cover, by observing the bits ranging from I[t(i − 1) + 1] to I[ti], the
sequence (di,1, . . . , di,t) transmitted by each leaf Ui located below the
sniffing point. The attacker will be unable to decrypt this sequence
because decryption requires knowledge of the secret key Ki.
The σ value does not provide any useful information to the attacker
either.
From I, an adversary can determine which leaves transmitted and
which ones did not. In applications where this fact causes informa-
tion disclosure, non-transmittal should not be allowed.
Leaf impersonation. This attack refers to the authentication property. An
intruder (who does not know Ki) trying to send a given symbol coming
from Ui faces several difficulties.
First of all, the q-ary symbol is encrypted prior to encoding it inside Ii.
Since the attacker does not know the encryption key, she can only fill
the corresponding t bits in Ii randomly. The probability that decryp-
tion of those bits leads to the desired q-ary symbol is 1/(2t − 1).
On the other side, the redundancy σi is also computed using Ki. In this
way, the probability of randomly guessing the appropriate σi is 1/2
s.
Leaf contribution alteration. This attack refers to the authentication and
integrity properties. In case the attacker captures and alters the contri-
bution of a leaf, the difficulty comes from the low probability of guessing
σ, which is 1/2s. A sufficiently large value s exponentially reduces the
chances of a corrupting attacker to stay undetected.
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Leaf contribution removal. The contribution of Ui can be easily erased if
σi is known. This fact will be considered as a non-transmittal by the
base station. To detect these erasure attacks, non-transmittal should
be disallowed.
In case the adversary does not know the σi value generated by Ui, she
must guess the appropriate σi with a probability of success 1/2
s.
Disruption of the aggregation of child node messages. A dishonest inter-
mediate node can decide not to aggregate a message received from
some of its child nodes. The base station will consider this fact as
a non-transmittal. To detect this situation non-transmittal should be
disallowed.
3.2.5 Performance analysis
We next evaluate the protocol performance in terms of message length and
computational cost at the sensor nodes. We also give an optimization of the
proposed protocol to improve the efficiency of the message length and reduce
the energy consumption at nodes due to communication.
Table 3.3 summarizes the performance results obtained. The values in
the table are justified below.
Message length
Our protocol keeps the length of messages constant on their way from the
leaves towards the base station. Each message consists of the pair (I, σ).
Component I encodes the q-ary symbol transmitted by each leaf and its
bitlength is tn, where n is the number of leaves of the multicast tree and
q ≤ 2t−1. Since t is a constant, the bitlength of I is O(n). Component σ has
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Table 3.3: Performance results
Item Cost
Message length (for n ↑↑) tn
Message length in the error-tracing procedure (for n ↑↑) (t + s)n
Cost of message generation O(n)
Cost of message aggregation O(n2)
Cost of symbol extraction O(n)
Cost of error tracing at intermediate nodes O(n2)
a constant length of s bits. So its length is O(1). In this way, messages have a
bitlength O(n)+O(1). For large values of n, this length asymptotically tends
to tn. Note that this length is linear, which represents a limitation on the
total amount of leaves which can participate in the network. However, it can
be proven that symbols sent by n leaves cannot be aggregated in a message
whose length is below O(n) when all symbols have the same probability of
being sent.
In the event of a corrupted message, the base station multicasts a message
which contains (I||σ1, . . . , σn||v). The first component has tn bits, the second
one sn bits and the last one O(1) bits. Thus, this special message has a
bitlength of O(n). For large values of n, this length asymptotically tends to
(t + s)n.
Computational cost
Next, we analyze the time complexity of the protocol in four operations: mes-
sage generation, message aggregation, symbol extraction and error tracing at
intermediate nodes.
Message generation. Each message has two components (Ii, σi). Leaf Ui em-
ploys O(n) time to generate the binary sequence Ii. The computation
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of σi does not depend on n, so it is O(1). During message generation,
each leaf verifies one signature and computes two hash functions and
at most t bitwise XOR operations.
As mentioned in Section 1.1.1, there are fast algorithms for digital
signature verification in resource-constrained environments. As a real
example, the authors of [BlaB05] implement the Elliptic Curve Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm [Ecds99, John01] on a MICA2 mote [Berk04,
Mica08], designed by researchers at the University of California at
Berkeley. This device offers an 8-bit, 7.3828-MHz ATmega 128L pro-
cessor, 4 kilobytes (KB) of primary memory (SRAM), and 128 KB of
program space (ROM). According to their results, an ECDSA signa-
ture verification in such a device takes about 24.17 seconds (this time
can only be expected to decrease as technology progresses).
The remaining operations (hash functions and bitwise operations) take
negligible time. Thus, our scheme is suitable for resource-constrained
leaves.
Message aggregation. An intermediate node receives and aggregates mes-
sages. Aggregation of {(Ij, σj)}j into (I, σ) requires at most O(n) bit-
wise OR operations over O(n)-long messages during the computation of
I. Computation of the new σ requires at most O(n) additions modulo
2s (each with cost O(1)). This results in a maximum O(n2) cost. Note
that intermediate nodes compute only bitwise operations and additions
modulo 2s. These operations are appropriate for resource-constrained
nodes.
Symbol extraction. The base station extracts the contribution of each leaf
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in a vector B = ((b1,1, . . . , b1,t), . . . , (bn,1, . . . , bn,t)) by processing com-
ponent I (total length tn bits). Since t is a constant, this time is O(n).
Integrity checking does not increase this cost.
Since the base station is a full-fledged device, we consider that all op-
erations executed in this step are affordable.
Error tracing at intermediate nodes. This procedure is only invoked in case
of a corrupted message event. An intermediate node may need to verify
a signature and check the value Ij sent by each of its children. Each
check takes O(n) time. Since the number of children may also be O(n),
the maximum time spent on this operation is O(n2). Checking σj has
at most the same cost.
In this step we require one signature verification. As explained above,
this operation is affordable on real sensor nodes like the MICA2 mote.
In addition to that, intermediate nodes must execute O(n2) additions
modulo 2s. These operations are suitable for resource-constrained nodes
too.
Message length optimization
Our system is designed for nodes that are resource and power-constrained
devices. This motivates the need to reduce energy consumption as much as
possible. Reducing the length of messages is one way to achieve this.
In our protocol, leaf Ui sends (Ii, σi) where Ii is a tn bit long binary
sequence. Useful information within Ii is contained in bits located between
positions t(i− 1) + 1 and ti. The remaining bits of Ii are set to 0.
This information could be represented in a more compact way using log n
bits to code index i and t bits for useful information. In this way, the length
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of Ii would be t+log n. Aggregation of vectors Ii would be done by concate-
nation. In this way, the length of a vector I containing data from j leaves
would be j(t + log n) bits.
For small values of j this results in shorter messages than those described
in our protocol above (i.e. when j(t + log n) < tn). Low values of j appear
at nodes that are far from the root. However, when j grows towards n this
new coding results in longer messages than those described above.
Therefore using this alternative coding when j satisfies j(t + log n) < tn
(near the leaves) and switching to the initial coding when messages get near
the root is a way to minimize the length of transmitted data.
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Secure and private information
sharing in MANETs
In this chapter we present two contributions related to information sharing
in mobile ad hoc networks. Both contributions provide security and privacy
for the users of the network. Incentives are given to thwart user misbehavior.
Section 4.1 presents an information system aiming to provide information
just in time and just in place in a specific area. This system is deployed in a
city within which a user, regardless of her location, can request information
any time using her mobile device and its wireless connection. Access to
information is made possible by a metropolitan ad hoc network based on
peers enabled with wireless technology. A typical application of this system
would be tourist information: a person touring a city can query the system
to obtain a list of museums near her current location or some information
about a given historical building she is currently visiting. This proposal has
been published in [Cast07].
Section 4.2 presents a new scheme designed to disseminate advertisements
through mobile ad hoc networks. This proposal exploits the capabilities
61
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of mobile ad hoc networks to increase the visibility of the products being
offered by merchants. The starting point is a merchant who generates an
advertisement that is subsequently disseminated by citizens who carry mobile
devices acting as network nodes. This scheme has been published in [Viej07].
4.1 Distributed information provision
In this section, we present an architecture for mobile ad-hoc networks which
has been published in [Cast07]. This scheme offers distributed information
provision in urban environments. It requires some collaborative users to
become information providers. Such volunteers are rewarded for their work.
The proposed architecture is specified as a protocol suite taking security and
privacy aspects into account.
4.1.1 System overview
We focus on an environment where some end-user nodes build a wireless ad
hoc network and act as information providers. These nodes devote some of
their computational resources (storage, bandwidth, processing power) to stor-
ing and serving information. In this way, when another user in the network
requests some information, those nodes storing the requested information can
supply it.
Volunteering to become an information provider is rewarded depending
to the amount of served information requests. Every time a server provides
information to some user, it obtains a receipt allowing it to prove that it
has performed the service. Periodically, the server contacts the main content
provider (i.e. the main source of content, in our case study the city tourist
office) to get paid according to the number of requests it has served. This is a
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way to encourage users to devote more resources to provide information. The
more information a server stores, the more requests it will be able to serve,
and thus, the more money it will receive for its service. A server located at
a certain place will probably contain information that may interest nearby
users.
4.1.2 System architecture
In this section we present the system components: entities, messages ex-
changed between entities and protocols between entities.
Entities
• Content Source (CS). This is the entity offering the information service.
In the aforementioned example about tourist information, this entity
may be the tourist office of a city holding information of particular
interest for residents or visitors. Some examples could be:
– Information on historical landmarks, including short multimedia
videos, audio streams and digital documents on them.
– Schedule of cultural and leisure activities, like cinema or theater,
including trailer viewing options.
– Information about restaurants: opening hours, menus, prices.
– Location of services: police stations, hospitals, pharmacies.
• Users. Users whose devices form the ad hoc network. We distinguish
two kinds of users:
– Those that query the system when they need information. Nor-
mally, they use a mobile device and request information through
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the ad hoc network. We refer to them as end-users (EU).
– Those that devote part of their computational resources to stor-
ing and serving some of the information supplied by the content
source. These users not necessarily use a mobile device. They
could store information in their desktop PC with an ad hoc net-
work interface. We refer to these users as server-users (SU).
Messages
We distinguish two types of communication:
• The first type follows a client-server paradigm and involves the content
source CS. We have chosen this approach because the communication
between CS and the other two entities (SU, EU) only occurs at very
specific moments and is unlikely to cause a bottleneck.
• The second type of communication, the dialog between an EU and a
SU, follows a peer-to-peer (P2P) paradigm.
Messages consist of two parts. The first part contains the message itself,
divided in two or three sections: message type, sender identifier (in the P2P
environment) and message body. The second part contains the cryptographic
data: the signature on the first part of the message, the algorithm used to
calculate the signature and the digital certificate for the sender’s public key.
This structure allows the receiver to verify the validity of the message.
Protocols
We use the following notations to describe our protocols:
• Pentity, Sentity: Asymmetric key pair of entity, where Pentity is the public
key and Sentity is the private key.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
4.1 Distributed information provision 65
• Sentity[m]: Digital signature of message m by entity. By digital sig-
nature we refer to computing the hash value of message m using a
collision-free one-way hash function and encrypting this hash value us-
ing the private key of entity.
• Eentity(m): Encryption of message m under the public key of entity.
• Dentity(c): Decryption of message c under the private key of entity.
• H(m): Hash value of message m using a collision-free one-way hash
function.
• m1||m2: Concatenation of messages m1 and m2.
We next detail the different protocols used by the entities participating
in the system:
End-user registration. To register as an end-user, a candidate user must
contact the CS and install the necessary application software. e.g. in
our tourist information case study we assume that there exist several
places in the city (e.g. airport, railway station or tourist office) where
a user can register.
The end-user registration protocol is as follows:
Protocol 1
1. The user does:
(a) Obtain the following information from the CS:
• Internet address from which to download the application
software.
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• Validity period, i.e. time window during which the user
will be allowed to use the system.
• Access code to download and install the software.
(b) Connect her device to the Internet and download the applica-
tion software.
(c) Install the application software.
(d) Run Procedure 1 below and obtain the private key SEU in
a PKCS#8 file [Pkcs08], and a Certificate Signing Request
(CSR).
(e) Send the CSR to the Content Provider.
2. The CS does:
(a) Issue the user’s certificate using the CSR.
(b) Add the issued certificate to the CS database.
(c) Send the issued certificate to the user.
3. The user stores the following information in a PKCS#12 [Pkcs08]
file:




1. Generate a private/public RSA key pair [Rsa78].
2. Store the private key in a PKCS#8 file.
3. Generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). The file must use
the PKCS#10 [Pkcs08] standard.
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4. Return the PKCS#8 file and the CSR.
Server-user registration. A user wishing to register as a server-user con-
tacts the CS from whom she will receive a unique identifier and the
software that will enable her to serve information. Afterwards, the
user generates a private/public key pair and sends her public key and
her identifier to the CS in order to get the corresponding certificate.
Finally, the user indicates the desired information items and downloads
them to her hard disk.
More formally, the server-user registration protocol is as follows:
Protocol 2
1. The user does:
(a) Sign a contract with the CS specifying the user’s rights and
duties.
(b) Send the user’s bank data for future payments to CS. For con-
fidentiality, these data are sent encrypted under the public key
of CS.
2. CS does:
(a) Generate a unique identifier Id.
(b) Send to the user the unique identifier Id and the software that
will enable the user to serve information. For confidentiality,
Id is sent encrypted under the public key PEU (the candidate
server-user is assumed to be already an end-user with a pri-
vate/public key pair (SEU , PEU)).
3. The user does:
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(a) Run Procedure 1 to obtain the private key SU in a PKCS#8
file, and a Certificate Signing Request (CSR).
(b) Send the CSR to CS.
4. CS does:
(a) Issue the user’s certificate using the CSR.
(b) Add the issued certificate to CS’s database.
(c) Send the issued certificate to the user.
(d) Send the catalog information.
5. The user stores the following information in a PKCS#12 file:
• User private key SU .
• User certificate.
• CS certificate.
Information request. When an end-user requests an information item, the
query reaches several server-users. Among these, those holding the re-
quested item return a positive acknowledgment. Then, the end-user
downloads the requested information from a particular server-user se-
lected among those which have sent positive acknowledgment. Finally,
the end-user sends a receipt to the selected server-user. As we will see
later on, the SU will use this receipt in order to claim the corresponding
reward from the CS.
Formally, the information request protocol is as follows:
Protocol 3
1. The end-user EU computes a request in order to obtain a specific
information, where the request consists of the following data:
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• Description of the requested item, I.
• Date and time of the request, Tr.
• Digital signature of I and Tr, S1 = SEU [I||Tr].
This query spreads using a broadcast approach. Therefore, all SU
who are close to EU receive her request.
2. Each server-user SU who receives the query does:
(a) Verify the digital signature S1 using EU’s public key.
(b) Search for the information.
(c) If I is in SU’s database, reply to EU. The reply contains the
following data:
• User’s request, REU = I||Tr.
• Date and time of the answer, Ta.
• Digital signature on REU and Ta, that is, S2 = SSU [REU ||T ].
3. EU does:
(a) Collect the replies from the SUs. Without loss of generality,
assume that the set of SU replying to EU is SU1, SU2, · · · , SUn.
See Section 4.1.4 below on the value of n.
(b) Verify the digital signatures of the SUs, that is, S21, S22, S23, · · · , S2n
using the public keys of each SU.
(c) Choose one server-user SU’ ∈ {SU1, SU2, · · · , SUn}. This
choice can be performed in a way to maximize privacy (see
Section 4.1.4 below).
(d) Send a request to SU’ with the following data:
• Description of the requested information, I.
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70 Secure and private information sharing in MANETs
• Date and time of the request, Tr.
• Identifier of the node this request is addressed to, IdSU ′.
• Digital signature on I, Tr and IdSU ′, that is, S3 = SEU [I||Tr||IdSU ′].
4. SU’ does:
(a) Verify the digital signature S3 using the public key PEU .
(b) Send the following message:
• Description of the requested information, I.
• Requested information, Info.
• Date and time of the answer, Ta.
• Digital signature of the I, Info and Ta, that is, S4 =
SSU ′[I||Info||Ta].
5. EU does:
(a) Verify the digital signature S4 using PSU .
(b) Check whether the received data correspond to the information
requested.
(c) If the check is OK, issue a receipt and send it to SU’ with the
following data:
• Description where EU asserts that she has received the
item described as I from SU’.
• Date and time, T .
• Identifier of SU’, IdSU ′.
• Digital signature on I, T , and IdSU , that is, S5 = SEU [I||T ||IdSU ].
6. SU’ does:
• Receive the receipt.
• Verify S5 using PEU
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4.1 Distributed information provision 71
• Store the receipt.
Server-user payment. As previously described, server-users get a receipt
every time they serve information. These receipts are stored. Once a
large enough batch of receipts has been collected, a server-user contacts
CS to get paid for the services provided. Note that sending receipts
one at a time to CS would be very inefficient. The reason is that, since
the reward for a single service is very low, the processing costs of such
a payment would be too significant.
The protocol to redeem a batch of receipts is as follows:
Protocol 4
1. SU sends the receipts to CS.
2. CS does:
(a) Verify the digital signature of each receipt
(b) Check for duplicated receipts
(c) Compute the money that must be paid to the information node
(d) Transfer the money to the bank account of SU
4.1.3 Security analysis
Our communication protocols use different types of messages to be trans-
mitted in each phase. Every exchanged message contains a plaintext part
and a valid signature. The plaintext part contains the information transmit-
ted between nodes and the signature provides authentication, integrity and
non-repudiation to such messages.
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Confidentiality
In principle, confidentiality is only implemented in the server-user registra-
tion protocol, when the user sends her bank data to CS and CS returns
a unique identifier (Steps 1 and 2 of Protocol 2). The rest of messages
are assumed to be non-confidential, which is plausible for most applications
(e.g. tourist information). However, if confidentiality is required, it can
be achieved by encrypting messages under the public key of the intended
receiver.
Collusion security
Collusion between end-users and server-users to obtain unlawful rewards is
conceivable: some end-users perform a huge amount of information requests
to certain server-users, and the latter then share with the former the rewards
obtained from the CS.
A possible solution is to charge the end-users a small fee for enjoying
the information service. This payment can be performed using offline elec-
tronic checks as stated in [Chau90] or any micropayment system (e.g. Pay-
Word, [Rive96]).
However, one must acknowledge that collecting payment from the end-
users can jeopardize the success of many applications, like the tourist infor-
mation system. Therefore, a preferred countermeasure against user collusion
is for the CS to record and analyze the number of receipts submitted by the
SUs and the number of receipts issued by the same EU. Since each receipt
contains the exact time and date when it was issued, a limit on the number
of requests that an EU can perform within a period of time can easily be
enforced. The CS will not honor any receipts beyond those that can be is-
sued by a certain user; furthermore, as soon as CS detects that an end-user
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has issued more receipts than allowed, CS alerts the SUs to stop serving any
further request from that suspect SU. The SUs receive this alert when they
synchronize resources with the CS or when they redeem their receipts. In
this way, the effects of possible user collusions are tolerably mitigated.
4.1.4 Privacy analysis
In any information service, end-user profiling is a real threat. Indeed, in-
formation providers can keep track of the requests submitted by end-users,
with a view to investigating their tastes, preferences, locations, etc. This is
clearly a potential privacy violation.
In a conventional information service where end-users get information di-
rectly from a single information provider, one often assumes that information
provider to be trusted or at least not to be interested in violating the pri-
vacy of end-users. At any rate, if there ever were any provable violation, the
information provider would be liable and could be charged accordingly.
In a peer-to-peer mobile ad hoc information service, the privacy problem
is much more serious. End-users obtain information through server-users
who are occasional information relayers and cannot be trusted to the same
extent as to privacy preservation.
End-user privacy can be significantly increased by using an alias when
registering as an end-user and by properly tuning Protocol 3:
• When the end-user application detects that there are server-users among
the n replying to Step 3a who already replied to more than p requests
from the same end-user in the past (p is a privacy parameter), the
application warns the end-user of a potential privacy problem. The
end-user has two choices: either move to a different area where she will
find different server-users or to go ahead and jeopardize her privacy.
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• In Step 3c, a wise policy is for the end-user application to choose the
server-user which has replied to least requests to the end-user in the
past.
Of course, we are assuming that the server-user application has not been
tampered with, so that: i) it replies when the server-user hears a request
for an information item it holds; ii) it forgets about requests for information
items the server-user does not hold.
In the presence of malicious server-users, a combination of the following
two strategies can be useful:
• Use short validity periods for end-users, which will force end-users to
frequently re-register under a new alias.
• Avoid issuing many information request from the same place, which
should be easy for a roaming end-user (e.g. tourist visiting a city).
Moving to another area is a way to get rid from the current server-
users, both the legitimate and the malicious ones.
4.2 Advertisement dissemination
In this section, we propose an advertisement dissemination model which has
been published in [Viej07]. This scheme exploits the capabilities of mo-
bile ad hoc networks to increase the visibility of the products being offered
by merchants. It offers incentives to stimulate the collaboration of nodes.
Cryptographic techniques are used to prevent manipulation and preserve the
privacy of users. Specifically, the AdPASS [Stra04] system is outperformed
in the following aspects:
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4.2 Advertisement dissemination 75
• Security is achieved against (individual or colluding) dishonest nodes
trying to modify transmitted advertisements in order to unlawfully in-
crease their share of incentives.
• Privacy is preserved without resorting to any trusted third party. Our
system only requires a certification authority (CA) to certify the mer-
chant’s public key. In any case, this authority can not disclose users’
identities.
• The incentives rewarding a certain purchase are distributed among all
co-operating users given on how long they have held the advertisement
leading to that purchase before transferring it to another user. This is a
fair proposal which does not restrict the advertisement’s dissemination
range.
Our scheme uses multisignatures over a Gap Diffie-Hellman group [Bold03].
The required mathematical background has been previously introduced in
Section 3.1.1.
4.2.1 System overview
Our protocol assumes the existence of a merchant and several mobile nodes
that communicate through a MANET. We assume the existence of dishonest
users (who may act individually or in collusion) interested in obtaining a
higher reward than the one they are entitled to. We do not require the users
to be registered with any central entity. Thus, our system is appropriate for
very dynamic environments where connectivity to a central entity may not
be guaranteed.
Functionally speaking, a user holding an advertisement actively contacts
users within her range and sends them the content of the advertisement.
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Initially, the advertisement is held by the merchant. Some of the contacted
nodes may purchase the advertised good and/or be interested in holding the
advertisement themselves for further dissemination.
On the occasion of a purchase request, the buyer sends to the merchant
the advertisement (if any) which has motivated her purchase; attaching the
advertisement entitles the buyer to a discount. The incentives rewarding that
purchase are distributed among the nodes in the path from the merchant to
the buyer proportionally to the time they have held the advertisement. E-
coins are used to pay those incentives.
In order to facilitate the distribution of incentives, when an advertisement
is transferred to a new holder, a time stamp indicating the moment of the
transfer is added to the advertisement. In this way, when an advertisement
comes back to the merchant together with a purchase request, the merchant
can ascertain the incentive that corresponds to each collaborating node. The
system is totally anonymous, i.e., the information that nodes add to an ad-
vertisement does not allow to identify them. Also, different contributions of a
node to different advertisements cannot be related. In this way, unlinkability
is also provided. Obviously, we are assuming that the appropriate measures
are being taken to avoid node tracking by other means (for instance, frequent
change of MAC and IP addresses).
The above system is sustainable for the merchant, who never loses money,
because incentives are only paid for advertisements which generated a pur-
chase.
4.2.2 Set of protocols for advertisement dissemination
We next describe the six protocols that conform the proposed system.
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4.2 Advertisement dissemination 77
Advertisement generation
Merchant M has its public key, PKM , and its digital certificate issued by a
Certification Authority, CertAut{PKM}. We denote by SKM the secret key
corresponding to PKM .
1. When M wants to promote a product, it generates an advertisement
α containing its public key certificate, the offer description and the
expiration time of this offer:
α = {CertAut{PKM}, Description, ExpirationT ime}
This advertisement is signed by M to obtain {α}SKM .
2. A node Ui interested in disseminating the advertisement contacts M
and receives the following message:
β = {α, PubKeyChain, Multisignature, T imeChain}
The fields of β are initialized as follows:
• PubKeyChain is an ordered list initially left empty;
• Multisignature is initialized to {α}SKM ;
• T imeChain is an ordered list initially containing a single element
that is a tuple formed by T ime and its signature {T ime}SKM ;
T ime corresponds to the time this operation has been performed.
3. Ui checks β (see the protocol for advertisement checking). If all checks
are correct, Ui accepts the advertisement from M and starts its dis-
semination.
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Advertisement dissemination
Upon accepting an advertisement, Ui informs other nodes about the offer it
contains. Due to the inherent mobility in the nodes, Ui is likely to disseminate
the offer quite far from M .
Additionally, when Ui contacts a nearby node Uj , Ui asks whether Uj is
interested in disseminating the advertisement (our scheme is not linked to
any specific framework to perform such initial contact between users, the
one presented in AdPASS [Stra04] can be used). If she is, they will start the
advertisement transfer. In order to guarantee anonymity and unlinkability,
nodes must change their MAC and IP addresses after each contact.
Note that, after an advertisement transfer from Ui to Uj , Ui still holds the
advertisement and can continue its dissemination and transfer to other nodes.
In this way, the number of nodes disseminating a certain advertisement can
grow exponentially.
Advertisement transfer
The advertisement transfer protocol requires users U to have a public/private
key pair (PKU/SKU). To provide unlinkability, this key pair has to be
changed after each execution. Before renewing her key pair, a user stores the
secret key. This key will be needed in order to receive the incentives (as will
be detailed next in the incentive payment protocol).
1. A user Uj interested in an advertisement α held by another user Ui asks
Ui to transfer it.
2. Ui appends her public key to the value PubKeyChain in β. This is
PubKeyChain′ := PubKeyChain ∪ PKUi
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4.2 Advertisement dissemination 79
3. Ui Computes the signature sig := {α}SKUi . Then she computes
Multisignature′ := Multisignature · sig
4. Ui obtains the current time, signs it and appends the signed time to the
time chain, that is: T imeChain′ := T imeChain∪{T ime || {T ime}SKUi}
(at the end).
5. Ui generates
β ′ := {α, PubKeyChain′, Multisignature′, T imeChain′}
and sends it to Uj.
6. Ui stores the secret key SKUi and generates a new key pair that will
be used at the next transfer.
7. Uj checks β
′ (see the protocol for advertisement checking). If all checks
are correct, Uj informs other nodes about the offer in β
′.
Advertisement checking
A user Ui receiving a message β should check its validity prior to accepting
it. This is done as follows:
1. Check the validity of CertAut{PKM} (obtained from α). This requires
checking the signature by the authority, its expiration date and, if
possible, its revocation status.
2. Compute the product of all public keys contained in PubKeyChain
and PKM . Let us denote by GlobalKey the result of this operation.
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3. Check that Multisignature is a correct signature over α that is vali-
dated using GlobalKey.
4. Check that ExpirationT ime (obtained from α) has not expired.
5. Check that the first element of T imeChain is a correct signature gen-
erated by the Merchant.
6. For each key contained in PubKeyChain, check that the j-th public key
in PubKeyChain can validate the (j + 1)-th signature in T imeChain.
7. Finally, check that the values of elements in T imeChain are sorted in
ascending order and that the last element corresponds to the current
time.
Advertisement deposit
A user Ui interested in the product advertised in β contacts the merchant
and buys it. By sending β to the merchant, Ui will obtain the price reduction
detailed in β. This price reduction motivates users to deposit advertisements.
Incentive payment
Once a merchant sells a product to a customer who has deposited an adver-
tisement, it has to pay the incentives to all users who have collaborated in
its dissemination.
The merchant gives a fixed amount of money for each received adver-
tisement. This amount of money is divided between collaborating nodes
proportionally to the time each collaborating node has held the advertise-
ment along the path from the merchant to the buyer (see Section 4.2.4 for
details about the model used to reward incentives). This information can be
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4.2 Advertisement dissemination 81
obtained from the values in T imeChain. The merchant does not know the
identity of the nodes that collaborated in the advertisement distribution. It
only knows their public key. For each payment the merchant authorizes her
bank to issue an e-coin. Let us assume user Ui (who remains anonymous and
is only known by her public key) has to receive an e-coin for a given value v.
The merchant sends a message to her bank indicating that she can issue an
e-coin with value v to any person providing password p. Then, the merchant
publishes a message in a public repository containing p encrypted with the
public key of Ui. This indirect procedure through a public repository is
needed because Ui is anonymous and may be temporarily out of range.
Later, Ui checks the repository, decrypts the message and obtains p. Us-
ing this password, the bank permits her to obtain an e-coin (through the
corresponding e-coin issuing protocol). The e-coin system must be anony-
mous such as the one proposed by Chaum in [Chau89]. This is because the
e-coin may later be spent non-anonymously (for instance, if the purchased
product has to be delivered by courier). If the e-coin system was not anony-
mous, it could be possible to link the identity of the person spending the
e-coin to the public key used in the dissemination protocol.
4.2.3 Example of an advertisement dissemination
We next clarify the operation of this scheme following the communication
steps described above. We base our explanation on the graphical example
shown in Figure 4.1.
1. Advertisement generation. The merchant wants to promote a
certain product and generates an advertisement and informs about it
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Figure 4.1: Graphical example of an advertisement dissemination
the users within range. User A is interested in disseminating this adver-
tisement and contacts the merchant to request transfer of the advertise-
ment β. Then A checks the validity of β and starts its dissemination.
This occurs at time T0.
2. Advertisement dissemination. A roams around while informing
other nodes she meets about advertisement β. Then, A transfers the
advertisement to two interested nodes B and D at times T0 + T1 and
T0 + T1 + T2 respectively. At time T0 + T1 + T3, node B transfers the
advertisement to node C.
3. Advertisement transfer. In each transfer, the node which receives
the advertisement checks its correctness (see the protocol for advertise-
ment checking) prior to accepting it.
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4. Advertisement deposit. User C is interested in the product ad-
vertised in β. Therefore, she contacts the merchant and buys it. By
sending β to the merchant, C will benefit from the price reduction
detailed in the offer.
5. Incentive payment. The merchant uses the values in the T imeChain
embedded in β to determine that A has carried this advertisement dur-
ing time T0 + T1 and B has carried it during T3. Then, the merchant
sends a message to its bank indicating that it can issue two e-coins
for values v1(T0 + T1) and v2(T3) to any person providing passwords p1
and p2 respectively. The joint value of those two e-coins is the fixed
amount that the merchant is willing to pay for each completed sale of
the product. Finally, the merchant publishes p1 and p2 encrypted with
the public key of A and B respectively in a public repository.
Later, A and B check the repository and obtain their respective pass-
word. Then, they contact the bank and obtain their respective e-coin
through the corresponding e-coin issuing protocol.
4.2.4 Comparison to other reward models
As explained before, in our scheme the merchant divides a fixed amount
of money between the nodes which have collaborated in an advertisement
dissemination. The money earned by a certain node is proportional to the
time which such a collaborating node has held the advertisement along the
path from the merchant to the buyer. We next explain the advantages of
this approach in comparison with the model presented in [Stra04] and with a
simple model where each node receives money each time it collaborates (this
scheme does not consider how long a node has held the advertisement, only
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if the node has held it or not).
In [Stra04], the merchant fixes an amount of points as reward to a certain
advertisement. Each user who collaborates in the dissemination will claim
the number of points that she desires. This means that if a greedy user
Ui claims too many points, the advertisement will not be disseminated by
any other user since there will not be enough remaining points. Thus, this
represents a strong restriction in the advertisement’s dissemination range.
Besides, users are not rewarded in a fair way and this motivates the users to
apply strategies for keeping and passing along points instead of collaborating
in the dissemination.
The simple model is fairer than [Stra04]. Each Ui which takes part in a
dissemination will receive the same amount of money. However it has two
main problems:
1. If there is no limit in the number of hops, there is no limit either in
the amount of money that the merchant must give as incentives. This
represents a major concern for the merchant. We can solve this problem
by enforcing an upper limit but then the advertisement dissemination
range will be restricted like in [Stra04].
2. Since the merchant gives incentives to each user who collaborates, a
certain user with n identities can transfer a certain advertisement to
herself n− 1 times (using her n− 1 alternative identities). At the end
of the process, this user will get incentives for each of her n identities.
To solve these two problems we propose to add a second dimension (how
long a user holds an advertisement) to the simple model. Besides, the mer-
chant establishes a fixed amount of money (incentives) that will be divided
between the collaborating users. We next explain how our proposal affects
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the two problems stated:
1. The merchant after each sale divides the money assigned to pay adver-
tisement dissemination between collaborating nodes proportionally to
the time each collaborating node has held the advertisement. It means
that the merchant never loses money. Besides, users will always receive
incentives, although a node which has held a certain advertisement for
a short time in comparison with others will probably get a very small
amount of money.
2. A certain user which holds an advertisement for n epoch (interval of
time) will get the same amount of money than a dishonest user which
has n different identities and holds the advertisement for one epoch
with each identity.
4.2.5 Security and privacy analysis
We next explain the adversary model and the possible attacks the system has
to be robust against. We refer to such attacks to prove the security properties
achieved by our scheme: integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. We
also explain how privacy (anonymity and unlinkability) is obtained.
Adversary model
In our system, an adversary is any entity or group of entities wishing to
disrupt normal system operation or aiming to collect information on nodes
who have collaborated in advertisement dissemination. The nodes that can
take part in a dishonest coalition are:
• The merchant. It may wish to identify and/or trace nodes who col-
laborate by spreading announcements. It may also repudiate having
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generated a certain offer.
• The bank. It may wish to identify and/or trace nodes who collaborate
in message dissemination.
• Dishonest users. They may wish to alter advertisements so as to in-
crease the amount of their assigned reward. They may also wish to
inject false disrupting data or identify and/or trace other users.
On the whole, an adversary can try to perform the following attacks:
• Modify the offer description.
• Repudiate having issued a certain advertisement (when the adversary
is the merchant).
• Remove the contribution made by some user to message dissemination.
• Issue a fake advertisement.
• Collect incentives corresponding to other users.
• Obtain the identity of a collaborating node and/or profile her by relat-
ing different interactions.
Attacks and security/privacy properties
Modification of an offer description. This attack refers to the integrity
property. Offer descriptions are issued by the merchant, so we assume
the merchant does not take part in the coalition. In our system, an
advertisement consists of a message with the following structure:
β = {α, PubKeyChain, Multisignature, T imeChain}
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The advertisement itself is α which contains its public key certificate,
the offer description and its expiration time:
α = {CertAut{PKM}, Description, ExpirationT ime}
Integrity of the offer description is ensured since α is signed by the
merchant (this signature is included in the Multisignature field) and
the signature scheme is unforgeable.
Advertisement repudiation. In our scheme, the merchant cannot repudi-
ate having issued an advertisement since it has been signed and the
signature on it is verifiable with a certified public key.
Note that, since collaboration in advertisement dissemination is anony-
mous, users do not need to repudiate having collaborated.
Removal of user contribution to dissemination. Another integrity aspect to
be considered is whether users having contributed to the distribution of
an advertisement can be unlawfully dropped and forgotten about. Let
us assume an advertisement coming from merchant M that has been
distributed by users U1, U2, . . . , Un. Let us assume that an intruder
wishes to remove Ui from β. The intruder must remove the public key
PKUi from PubKeyChain and remove {T ime || {T ime}SKUi} from
T imeChain. Both removals can be done without any difficulty.
The difficulty for the intruder is to alter the Multisignature field. This
field contains the value
Multisignature = H(α)SKM+SKU1+SKU2+...+SKUn .
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The intruder must be able to obtain
Multisignature′ = Multisignature · (H(α)SKUi)−1
Since discrete logarithms are hard to compute in a GDH group, the only
way to obtain such value by an intruder is to get the Multisignature
field before Ui’s contribution. This value can only be obtained if the
intruder contacts directly the user who transferred β to Ui. This cannot
be done due to the anonymity of the system.
Issuance of a fake advertisement. This attack refers to the authentication
property. Our system requires the merchant to sign advertisements
using a public key certified by an accepted authority. Generation of a
certain advertisement that will be accepted as authentic coming from
a valid merchant M requires knowledge of its private key SKM . As
long as this secret key is not compromised and the signature scheme
is unforgeable (a valid signature can only be computed if the secret is
known) the system provides authentication and remains secure against
this attack.
Collecting incentives from other users. This situation refers to the authen-
tication property too. In our system, E-coins given as incentives can
only be collected by the users who have earned them. This is ensured
by the incentive payment procedure. During this procedure, the mer-
chant publishes the password required to obtain an e-coin encrypted
with a public key whose corresponding private key is only known by
the authentic user. In this way, only the authentic user will be able to
obtain this password and request the e-coin.
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4.2 Advertisement dissemination 89
Disclosure of the identity and/or tracing of users. This attack compromises
the privacy of the users. This property consists of two components that
must be guaranteed:
• Anonymity: Interaction with the system should not reveal the
identity of the user.
• Unlinkability: It should not be possible to relate different interac-
tions by the same user.
The anonymity of users collaborating in the dissemination of an ad-
vertisement is ensured because they simply are requested to provide a
public key that does not reveal anything about their identity. Obtain-
ing the password that permits to request an e-coin does not require
the user to identify herself either. Finally, an anonymous e-coin system
like [Chau89] also provides anonymity when obtaining and spending an
e-coin.
Unlinkability is provided if users use a different key pair each time they
perform an advertisement transfer. Each user U is able to randomly
generate a new public/private key pair (SKU/PKU) at will and there
is no connection between all the key pairs used by a certain user. Thus,
two different public keys from the same user cannot be related by an
observer.
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information spread in VANETs
Vehicular ad hoc networks allow vehicle-to-vehicle communication and, in
particular, vehicle-generated announcements.
As explained in Section 1.1.3, announcements are spread to inform about
road conditions (traffic jams, accidents). Vehicles which receive such an-
nouncements can take advantage of that information to select routes avoid-
ing troublesome points. In contrast, alert messages are transmitted to warn
nearby vehicles about dangerous movements (braking, lane change, etc). Ac-
cording to that, announcement messages require a longer dissemination range
than alert messages. Besides, they demand a real-time processing which is
much less strict than in the case of alerts. Therefore, advanced cryptogra-
phy can be used to make such messages secure and trustworthy. Provided
that the trustworthiness of such announcements can be guaranteed, they can
greatly increase the safety of driving.
In this chapter, we present a new system designed to spread vehicle-
generated announcements through VANETs. This work has been published
91
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in [Daza08].
Trustworthiness is provided by following the a priori protection paradigm
(see Section 2.3 for detailed discussion about protection paradigms). Internal
attacks are thwarted by using an endorsement mechanism based on threshold
signatures. Our system outperforms [Raya06b] in message length and com-
putational cost. To the best of our knowledge, [Raya06b] is the most compet-
itive scheme in the literature that follows the a priori protection paradigm.
Regarding privacy, we describe three different privacy-preserving variants
of our system which ensure that vehicles volunteering to generate and/or
endorse trustworthy announcements do not have to sacrifice their privacy
(anonymity and unlinkability). The protocol detailed in [Raya06b] did not
preserve the privacy of the volunteer vehicles.
Section 5.1 gives some cryptographic background needed to understand
the proposed system. Section 5.2 presents our scheme in detail.
5.1 Cryptographic background
5.1.1 Secret sharing
A secret sharing scheme is a method by means of which a special figure, called
dealer, distributes a secret s among a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of n players. The
dealer secretly sends to each player Pi his share si of the secret s in such a
way that only authorized subsets of players can recover the secret.
A (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a particular case in which au-
thorized subsets are those composed of at least t players. Shamir’s threshold
secret sharing scheme [Sham79] gives a solution to this problem. Indeed, let
Zq be a finite field with q > n and s ∈ Zq be the secret to be shared. The
dealer picks a polynomial p(x) of degree at most t− 1 at random, whose free
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term is the secret s, that is, p(0) = s. The polynomial p(x) can be written
as p(x) = s +
∑t−1
j=1 ajx
j , where aj ∈ Zq has been randomly chosen.
Each player Pi is assigned a known value αi ∈ Zq. Then, the dealer
privately sends to player Pi his share si = p(αi), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, a set A ⊂ P of at least t players can recover the secret s = p(0)
by interpolating the set of shares they hold:
















Values λAi are called the Lagrange coefficients. It can be proven that less
than t players cannot obtain any information about the secret s.
5.1.2 Threshold signatures
Digital signatures allow to send authenticated and non-repudiable messages.
The message sender is required to have a public/private key pair. Signature
generation is an algorithm that takes as input the message, m, and the
sender’s private key, SK. Its output is the signature σ(m) on m. Signature
verification is performed by the receiver. Its algorithm takes as input the
message m, its signature σ(m) and the sender’s public key PK. It outputs
”yes” or ”no” to reflect the validity of σ(m). A valid signature convinces the
receiver about the integrity of m and is taken as a proof that the message
was generated by the authentic sender (the only party knowing SK).
A (t, n)-threshold signature distributes the signing operation among a
group of n participants. Each participant in a distributed signature scheme is
given a share, SKi, of the secret key, SK, in such a way that to sign a message
every participant computes a partial signature, σi(m), using his share of the
secret key. Then, any set of at least t participants can compute a valid
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signature σ(m) on the message by combining their partial signatures. The
resulting signature is equivalent to the one that results in the non-distributed
case (it is also verifiable using PK). A distributed signature scheme is said to
be non-interactive if every participant can compute his partial signature on
a message m without interacting with the rest of participants. Signatures in
[Shou00, Bold03, Fouq01, Damg01] are examples of non-interactive threshold
signature schemes.
For the sake of concreteness, we next recall an efficient threshold signature
scheme, namely the one in [Bold03], a distributed version of the signature
scheme by Boneh, Lynn and Shacham (BLS, [Bone01]). Both schemes work
over Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups – see original papers for more details.
In a nutshell, these signature protocols based on pairings are quite efficient
as the signing process only requires hash operations and modular exponen-
tiations and the verification process two pairing computations. In [Barr02]
a fast implementation of the Tate pairing computation was given and the
BLS signature scheme was compared with an RSA signature on a Pentium
PIII processor at 1 GHz. Using RSA with a modulus length |n| = 1024 bits
and a private exponent length |d| = 1007 bits, signing took 7.90 ms and
verifying took 0.4 ms. Using the BLS signature with elliptic curves over F397 ,
signatures were 160 bits long (which yields a similar security as the above-
mentioned 1024-bit RSA signature), and signing and verifying took 3.57 ms
and 53 ms, respectively. So there exist threshold signatures with reasonable
computational cost.
Let G be a GDH group, g =< G > be a generator of the group and p
be the order of the group. Using methods described in [Genn96], every par-
ticipant Pi obtains a share SKi. The set of shares realizes a (t, n)-threshold
access structure, that is, t parties can retrieve the secret key SK whereas
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less than t cannot obtain any information on the secret key. The retrieval
process can be performed by means of Lagrange interpolation and also yields
the matching public key PK = gSK . To sign a message m, a participant Pi
computes his partial signature as σi(m) = H(m)SKi (H is a public one-way
and collision-free hash function) and broadcasts σi(m). After a set A of at
least t participants have broadcast their partial signatures σi(m) for message









i SKi = H(m)SK
where λAi are the Lagrange coefficients.
5.1.3 Privacy in secret sharing
In short, an anonymous secret sharing scheme is one where participants can
co-operate in the retrieval of the secret while keeping their identity undis-
closed (anonymity) and without successive co-operations by the same partic-
ipant being linkable (unlinkability). Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold secret sharing
scheme described in Section 5.1.1 does not offer unlinkability: each Lagrange
coefficient corresponds to a certain participant Pi and, even if that corre-
spondence is kept secret for anonymity (i.e. by using the underlying αi
as pseudonyms), successive co-operations by the same participant can be
linked because the Lagrange coefficient of the participant appears every time.
Anonymous secret sharing schemes in the literature present a very high cost
that limits their practical applicability [Blun97].
Note that, if the secret sharing scheme underpinning a threshold signature
protocol is not anonymous, the resulting threshold signature is either linkable
(successive partial signatures by a participant can be linked) or requires a
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trusted third-party and is thus unsuitable for a VANET.
5.2 Trustworthy privacy-preserving announce-
ments in VANETs
In this section, a new system for secure announcements in VANETs is pre-
sented. It uses digital signatures to prevent external attackers from being
able to inject false messages and follows the a priori approach to thwart
fake announcements sent by internal attackers. An announcement will only
be considered as being valid if it has been endorsed by at least t different
vehicles.
5.2.1 Non-private protocol
For clarity, let us begin with a protocol which can offer anonymity but not
unlinkability.
• Set-up: During this stage, the carmakers set up a (t, n)-threshold sig-
nature scheme, where n is the maximum number of vehicles allowable
in the VANET. To do this, the carmakers must agree on a polynomial
of degree (t−1) that will be evaluated at points αi, for i = 1 to n. The
range of n points is partitioned into several subranges, each of which is
assigned to a carmaker. The number n can be very large without scala-
bility problems. Next, a public key PK and n shares SKi, i = 1, . . . , n
of the secret key SK are generated. Each vehicle Pi is equipped with
the public key PK and its secret key share SKi; the share SKi is held
in a smart card plugged into the vehicle (tamper-resistance is assumed
for the card in what follows). When input the hash value H(m) of a
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message, the smart card returns a partial signature on that hash value,
that is, σi(m) = H(m)SKi. Anonymity is obtained by not linking SKi
with the identity of the vehicle; this makes sense for other reasons too
because, smart cards being removable, several smart cards each holding
a different secret key share could alternatively be used with the same
vehicle (like several cards can be used with a cellphone).
• Announcement generation: When a vehicle Pi wishes to send an an-
nouncement m, Pi computes the partial signature σi(m) and broadcasts
m and σi(m). An announcement should only reach vehicles that are
close enough to the originating vehicle so as to be able to check the va-
lidity of the announced condition. Since they do not need to reach dis-
tant points, announcement messages are not relayed by VANET nodes
and they travel only up to the range of the broadcast technology used
(even if a maximum range of 1000 meters for car-to-car communication
with the Dedicated Short Range Communication protocol is reported
in [Raba07], typical ranges from 300 to 500 meters on highways and
about 100 meters in cities are mentioned in [Berg07]).
• Announcement endorsement: If vehicle Pj receives an announcement
m (together with the partial signature on it by the announcement orig-
inator Pi) and wishes to endorse m, then Pj computes its own par-
tial signature σj(m) on m and broadcasts H(m) and σj(m) to return
them to Pi, where H() is the same hash function used in the signature
computation. As in announcement generation, messages with partial
signatures are not relayed.
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• Signature composition: The vehicle Pi which generated an announce-
ment stores m and the partial signatures on m it receives (partial signa-
tures on m are identifiable by the hash H(m) they carry). Once Pi has
collected t different partial signatures on m, it can compute a standard
signature σ(m) and broadcast it along with m.
• Announcement reception and verification: Vehicles in the VANET will
only consider as trustworthy those announcements carrying a standard
signature that can be verified using the public key PK. The use of the
threshold signature scheme provides vehicles with the assurance that
such a standard signature can only have been computed if at least t
vehicles have endorsed m by computing their partial signature on it.
These messages, containing a standard signature, will be relayed by
VANET nodes. In this way, they will reach distant vehicles which will
benefit from the information in the messages.
The reason for keeping SKi in a smart card is to prevent the vehicle driver
from learning SKi; otherwise, t colluding drivers could recover the secret key
SK, which would allow any single one of them to sign messages that would
be accepted as trustworthy without any endorsement.
In any case, the choice of t is a trade-off between security and availability.
On one hand, t should be high enough so that the probability of there being
t or more within-range colluding vehicles who could validly endorse fake
messages is reasonably low (security). On the other hand, t should not be so
high that finding t − 1 additional within-range endorsers is too difficult for
an honest announcement generator (availability).
The problem with the above protocol is that it lacks privacy and, more
precisely, unlinkability. This is due to the fact that signature composition
requires computing Lagrange coefficients (see Section 5.1.1). Computation
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of such coefficients requires in turn knowledge of the value αi assigned to
each vehicle Pi having contributed a partial signature. Certainly, it can be
assumed and it is assumed that the correspondence between Pi and αi is
withheld (αi is used a pseudonym for vehicle Pi), which provides anonymity.
However, different partial signatures generated by the same vehicle Pi all use
αi, so they are linkable. Therefore, unlinkability is not achieved.
5.2.2 Cost analysis of the non-private protocol
In this section we compare the cost of our non-private protocol above with
the cost of the concatenated signatures protocol in [Raya06b]. Both protocols
are non-private, so the comparison is fair. In the next subsections, the cost
is analyzed in terms of announcement length, announcement generation time
and announcement verification time.
Announcement length
In the concatenated signatures protocol in [Raya06b], authenticated an-
nouncements contain as many signatures and public key certificates as en-
dorsing vehicles, so their length is O(t). In our proposal, both the partially
signed announcements and the completely signed announcements contain a
single signature, so the length of announcements is O(1).
Since the above comparison in O-notation may be misleading for small
values of t, we next compare both proposals by taking the constant terms
into account. We assume that [Raya06b] uses the concatenated signatures
protocol with the RSA public key cryptosystem with 1024 bit moduli (so,
digital signatures will be 1024 bits long). Let us consider that the information
which is announced is a bits long. The concatenated signatures protocol
in [Raya06b] requires one signature and one public key certificate from t
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different signers. We will consider that a digital certificate contains an RSA
public key (barely longer than the 1024-bit modulus if a short public exponent
is used), the owner’s pseudonym (which could be a 64-bit serial number) and
a signature by the Certification Authority (1024 bits). According to that, the
total length of an announcement in [Raya06b] is a+ t ·(3 ·1024+64) bits. For
example, if four endorsing vehicles are required (t = 4), this scheme yields
an announcement length of a + 12544 bits. With the same assumptions, our
proposal has a constant announcement length of a + 160 bits (we are using
the BLS signature scheme). As t grows, the advantage of using our system
increases.
Announcement generation delay
In [Raya06b] vehicles sequentially contribute with their signature to endorse
an announcement. This means that a valid message generation takes at least
the time necessary for a message to perform t−1 hops plus the time required
to compute t digital signatures. This is an O(t) cost. Let j be the time
(in milliseconds) necessary for a message to perform one hop. According
to the signature generation time reported in Section 5.1.2, a valid message
generation in [Raya06b] using the RSA cryptosystem with 1024 bit public
keys takes 7.90 · t + (t− 1) · j ms.
In our protocol, vehicles can endorse a message in parallel. So, the delay
due to data transmission required to generate a valid message is fixed to the
time to perform 2 hops (one from the generator to within-range endorsers
and another from endorsers to the generator) plus the time to compute 2
BLS signatures. This time is 2 · (j + 3.57) ms.
After t endorsement messages have been collected in our protocol, a stan-
dard signature is composed by the vehicle originating a message at an O(t)
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cost (the cost of computing a standard signature from t partial signatures).
As can be seen in Section 5.1.2, the cost of this operation is dominated by
the exponentiation of each partial signature to its corresponding Lagrange
coefficient. The cost of each exponentiation is similar to the cost of comput-
ing one digital signature (also consisting of one exponentiation). Thus, the
composition time is approximately t · 3.57 ms.
The overall generation time with our protocol is 2 · (j + 3.57) + t · 3.57
ms. This expression can be rewritten as 2 · j + (t + 2) · 3.57 ms. This is a
shorter time than the one required by [Raya06b]. As t grows, the advantage
of using our system increases.
Announcement verification time
In [Raya06b] announcement verification requires checking t signatures and t
public key certificates. If certificates are subject to revocation, there is an
additional cost related to checking certificate revocation lists (even this cost
is not explicitly mentioned in [Raya06b]). In any case, the verification cost
is O(t).
In our protocol, an announcement is verified by checking one signature.
Since the public key PK used for verification is always the same and is stored
in the smart card by the carmaker, its validity does not need to be checked.
This is an O(1) cost.
Let us now consider the constant terms for greater accuracy. Assume the
RSA and the BLS signature schemes are used by [Raya06b] and our proposal,
respectively. Section 5.1.2 details the signature verification time for each
signature scheme. In this way, an announcement verification in [Raya06b]
takes 2·0.4·t ms (the verifier checks the certificate and message signatures sent
by each endorsing vehicle). The same operation using our protocol takes 53
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
102 Private and trustworthy information spread in VANETs
ms. Therefore, with those assumptions, our proposal outperforms [Raya06b]
only when t ≥ 67. In practice, t will be usually less than 67, so that [Raya06b]
will normally be faster than our protocol as far as the computation involved
in signature verification goes.
Nonetheless, if the time and communication needed to check certificate
revocation lists was taken into account, our proposal would be more efficient,
because in [Raya06b] a certificate revocation list may need to be checked for
each certificate to be verified.
Summary of cost analysis
Table 5.1 summarizes the cost of both protocols as a function of the threshold
t. The strong points of our proposal are that the following is constant:
announcement length and announcement verification time.
If a more accurate analysis of the constant terms is performed (which is
necessary when t is small), it turns out that our system still yields shorter
announcements and faster announcement generation than [Raya06b]. An-
nouncement verification, on the contrary, is faster with [Raya06b] at least for
the usual (small) values of t.
However, if the cost of checking certificate revocation lists is consid-
ered in announcement verification, the picture changes dramatically. In-
deed, [Raya06b] requires verifying t certificates, which may require checking
certificate revocation lists t times. This may be very long, as it involves
communication, not just computation. In our proposal, the validity of PK
does not need checking, as explained above. So, when the cost of check-
ing certificate revocation is included, our proposal is more efficient also for
announcement verification.
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Table 5.1: Cost breakdown as a function of the threshold t of the non-private
protocol in [Raya06b] and the non-private protocol in this paper
Protocol [Raya06b] Our protocol
Announcement length O(t) O(1)
Announcement generation time O(t) O(t)
Announcement verification time O(t) O(1)
5.2.3 Group-based private protocol
In this section, a modification of the previous protocol is described in order
to provide unlinkability. The modification mainly affects the set-up phase.
• Set-up: The n vehicles that form the VANET are divided into r groups,
with each group consisting of n/r vehicles (for simplicity, it is assumed
that parameters n and r are chosen so that r divides n, but suitable
rounding can be used in the general case). The carmakers set up a
(t, r)-threshold signature scheme. During this generation, a public key,
PK, and r shares, SKj , j = 1, . . . , r, of the secret key SK are generated
(one share for each group). Each carmaker keeps a copy of each of the
r shares. Each manufactured vehicle Pi is randomly assigned by the
carmaker to a group j; then it is equipped with the public key PK and
the secret key share SKj assigned to its group (as above, SKj is held
in a smart card plugged to the vehicle).
This modification causes vehicles belonging to the same group to be as-
signed the same secret key share. In this way, partial signatures cannot be
related to a single vehicle but to any member of its group. If groups are
large enough, this protocol provides unlinkability. On the other side, a valid
signature σ(m) must now be generated not just by any t vehicles, but by
vehicles belonging to at least t different groups.
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Security, privacy and availability
Parameters t and r of the group-based protocol have an impact on security
against fake messages, on privacy and on availability.
The threshold t should be set high enough so that the probability of there
being t or more colluding vehicles who could validly endorse false announce-
ments is reasonably low.
For a choice of t, parameter r must be chosen considering the trade-off
between unlinkability and availability:
• Unlinkability. The group size g := n/r must be large enough so that
linkability at the group level (which cannot be avoided) does not imply
linkability at the vehicle level.
• Availability. The number of groups r must be large enough so that,
given an announcement, finding t endorsing vehicles from different
groups is easy. Thus, r  t.
By construction, this proposal has the same cost as the non-private pro-
tocol (see Section 5.2.1).
5.2.4 Extended group-based private protocol
In the previous group-based protocol, it may be difficult in some cases to find
a value for r striking a balance between unlinkability and availability. This
is the case when the VANET is sparse or consists of an actual number n′ of
vehicles much less than the maximum allowable number n. Since the group
size cannot be too small if unlinkability is to be preserved, the number r of
groups has to be small. In those conditions finding t within-range endorsing
vehicles from different groups may be quite challenging.
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A solution to mitigate the problem caused by a small r is to use d different
threshold signature schemes so that, if t within-range endorsing vehicles from
different groups cannot be found for the first scheme, they are sought for the
second scheme, and so on. The modified set-up, announcement generation,
endorsement and signature composition phases are:
• Set-up: The n vehicles that form the VANET are divided into r groups,
as in Section 5.2.3. The carmakers set up d different (t, r)-threshold
signature schemes. For k = 1 to d, the k-th scheme consists of a public
key PKk and r shares, SKkj , j = 1, . . . , r (one share per group). Each
carmaker keeps a copy of all r shares for all d signature schemes. For
i = 1, . . . , n, each manufactured vehicle Pi is equipped with the pub-




where ik ∈R {1, . . . , r} is the group randomly assigned by the carmaker
to Pi for the k-th threshold signature scheme. As above, all secret key
shares are held in a smart card.
The only variation in the extended group-based protocol with respect to
the previous protocols (non-private, group-based) in what respects the an-
nouncement generation, endorsement and signature composition steps is that
now messages in those steps must include a field specifying which threshold
signature scheme among the d possible ones is being used in a particular
execution.
Announcement generation, endorsement and signature composition are
attempted for the first threshold signature scheme as in Section 5.2.3. If,
after a predefined timeout, partial signatures from t different groups have not
been collected, announcement generation and endorsement are re-started for
the second threshold signature scheme. The process stops when a threshold
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signature scheme is found for which endorsements from t different groups can
be collected. In the worst case, all d threshold signatures schemes can fail.
Storage requirements at the vehicles are increased. In this case, each
vehicle stores d key shares and d public keys (compared to one share and one
public key in the previous proposal).
5.2.5 Semi-private protocol for sparse VANETs
The protocol in Section 5.2.4 is not without drawbacks. Even with d different
threshold signature schemes, collecting endorsement from t different groups
may fail in very sparse VANETs. A way to circumvent the above problem is
to drop groups but to keep several threshold signature schemes for privacy.
The modified protocol looks as follows:
• Set-up: The carmakers set up d′ different (t, n)-threshold signature
schemes. Like in the non-private protocol of Section 5.2.1 but for each
signature scheme in this protocol, the range of n points corresponding
to possible vehicles is partitioned into several subranges, each of which
is assigned to a carmaker. For k = 1 to d′, the k-th scheme consists
of a public key PKk and n shares, SKki , i = 1, . . . , n (one share per
vehicle). For i = 1, . . . , n, each vehicle Pi is equipped with the public
keys (PK1, . . . , PKd
′
) and the secret key shares (SK1i , . . . , SK
d′
i ), with
share SKki being obtained by evaluating the polynomial of the k-th
scheme at point αki , where α
k
i is assumed to belong to the subrange of
the carmaker of Pi for the k-th scheme.
• Announcement generation: When a vehicle Pi wishes to send an an-
nouncement m, Pi randomly selects one of the d
′ threshold signature
schemes, say scheme k. One can assume that the selection is performed
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
5.2 Trustworthy privacy-preserving announcements in VANETs 107
by the smart card in the vehicle so that the selected k is beyond the
user’s control. Then Pi computes its partial signature σ
k
i (m) on m
and broadcasts the announcement and its partial signature. This solu-
tion also requires messages to include a field indicating which signature
scheme k is being used.
• Announcement endorsement: If vehicle Pj receives the announcement
m (together with the partial signature on it by the announcement orig-
inator Pi) and wishes to endorse m, Pj uses the k-th threshold scheme
to compute its own partial signature σkj (m) on m and broadcasts H(m)
and σkj (m), where H() is the same hash function used in the signature
computation.
• Signature composition: The vehicle Pi which generated an announce-
ment stores m and the partial signatures on m it receives (partial signa-
tures on m are identifiable by the hash H(m) they carry). Once Pi has
collected t different partial signatures on m, it can compute a standard
signature σk(m) and broadcast it along with m.
• Announcement reception: Vehicles in the VANET will only consider as
trustworthy those announcements carrying a standard signature that
can be verified using a public key PKk in the set (PK1, . . . , PKd
′
).
The above semi-private protocol requires vehicles to store d′ shares and
d′ public keys.
Security, privacy and availability
As in the previous protocols, the threshold t is the parameter controlling
security against insertion of fake announcements.
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Unlinkability is related to parameter d′, the number of threshold signature
schemes set up by the carmaker for this protocol. Provided that the threshold
signature scheme is randomly selected, the probability that two successive
participations by Pi can be linked is 1/d
′ (this happens if the same threshold
signature scheme is selected in both cases). Thus, unlinkability improves
with respect to the non-private protocol (Section 5.2.1) but it is worse than in
the group-based or extended group-based protocols (Section 5.2.3 and 5.2.4,
respectively). However, the advantage is increased availability in that there
are no constraints on the t vehicles that must endorse an announcement (any
t vehicles will do), so that the endorsement process is easier in very sparse
VANETs with really few vehicles per area unit.
A way to improve unlinkability is by taking a large d′, which does not
affect the announcement verification time. This is different from what hap-
pens in the extended group-based protocol if parameter d is increased: there,
the signature schemes are tried one after the other until a valid signature is
obtained or the d schemes have been tried, so a large d may result in longer
verification times.
5.2.6 Compound protocol
The protocol in Section 5.2.5 can be used as a fallback for the protocol in
Section 5.2.4, which in turn is a fallback for the protocol in Section 5.2.3.
The idea is that vehicles can be set up for all three protocols by the carmaker.
The first option to be tried is the group-based protocol. If traffic sparseness
is such that partial signatures from t different groups cannot be collected
for a certain announcement before a fixed timeout, then the protocol in
Section 5.2.4 is used. If this does not work either, the protocol Section 5.2.5
can be used to get limited unlinkability without increasing the difficulty of
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collecting endorsements with respect to the non-private protocol. According
to that, a compound protocol combining the protocols in Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.4
and 5.2.5 can be specified as follows:
1. Initially, the group-based protocol of Section 5.2.3 is used. Note that
this protocol is a particular case of the extended group-based protocol
where there is only one (t, n)-threshold signature scheme in use. Thus,
hereafter we will consider this step as a part of the next step, where
the extended group-based protocol is used. (In what follows we will
only refer to the extended group-based protocol and the semi-private
protocol. This also applies to the simulation results which will be
presented in Section 5.2.7.)
2. If a complete signature cannot be constructed before a certain time-
out, the extended group-based system of Section 5.2.4 is launched.
Construction of a complete signature by means of d different (t, n)-
threshold signature schemes is attempted. The timeout in use depends
on the value t (the number of different partial signatures required to
compute a standard signature). For each unit increase of threshold t,
the timeout increases by β milliseconds.
Each of the d signature schemes is tried in sequence until a complete
signature is constructed or the timeout expires, so at most d× timeout
milliseconds are spent on the extended group-based system.
3. If the extended group-based system does not work either, the semi-
private protocol (see Section 5.2.5) is tried.
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Compound set-up phase
The compound protocol is composed of three schemes. In previous sections,
we have presented the set-up phase for each of these schemes. We next
explain the compound set-up phase when deploying such a system in a real
environment.
Let us consider the co-existence of m carmakers in a certain area. The i-th
carmaker produces vi hundreds of thousands of vehicles per year. According
to the European Environment Agency [Eea08], the EU-15 area had about 170
millions of vehicles in 2004. Even though the carmakers produce v1+ · · ·+vm
hundreds of thousands of new cars each year, there is also a large quantity of
old vehicles which are eliminated in the same period. Therefore, the size of
the vehicle fleet in a certain area does not undergo a strong increase from year
to year. Value n is the maximum number of vehicles allowable in the system
covering the area. The only assumption on n is that it cannot be greater than
the cardinality of the group used to construct the BLS signature scheme. For
cryptographic security reasons, this cardinality should be at least 2160. So,
we can set a value for n close to this upper limit. Such a huge n ensures that
we will never run out of key shares. As it can be seen in Section 5.1 a huge
n can be used without any negative impact on the system performance.
Our system requires a governmental authority GA in the geographical
area of deployment to ensure a correct set-up phase. Note that this author-
ity is no longer needed when executing the compound protocol. The only
role of the authority is to coordinate share distribution among the vehicles
produced by different carmakers. In this way, GA establishes d signature
schemes and the number r of groups of vehicles in the area. According to
that, each signature scheme generates r shares. Each share is linked to one
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group. Additionally, GA partitions the n possible vehicles into several sub-
ranges, each of which is assigned to a carmaker. It also establishes d′ different
threshold signature schemes. Each one generates n shares. Note that a cer-
tain carmaker receives the shares that correspond to its assigned subrange of
n.
Now, let us consider that a certain vehicle Pi is manufactured. This
car has to be set up by its carmaker for both extended group-base and
semi-private protocols. This process has been explained individually in Sec-
tions 5.2.4 and 5.2.5. We next summarize it:
• Extended group-base protocol. For each signature scheme k = 1, . . . , d,
Pi is randomly assigned by the carmaker to a group jk (where jk ∈
{1, . . . , r}) and it is equipped with the share corresponding to group
jk.
• Semi-private protocol. Pi is equipped with shares (SK1i , . . . , SKd′i ),
where the share SKwi is obtained by evaluating the polynomial of the
w-th scheme at point αwi , which is assumed to belong to the subrange
of the carmaker of Pi.
The compound set-up phase we have presented relies on the assumption
that an authority GA exists which coordinates share distribution. An open
problem is to devise a compound set-up phase which can work when no GA
is available.
5.2.7 Simulation
Our scheme for secure vehicle-generated announcements over VANETs was
simulated in a realistic environment, where the range of car-to-car broadcasts
was assumed to be 100m (the worst-case, urban range according to [Berg07]).
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The goal of our simulations is to observe the performance of the compound
protocol explained in Section 5.2.6. This protocol requires a timeout that
depends on values β and t. In our simulations, we have fixed β to 50 ms.
According to that, t = 4 represents a timeout of 200 milliseconds.
Simulation set-up
The network simulator ns-2 [Netw08] was used. The VANET scenario was
built using the scenario generator presented in [Saha04]. The road network
considered covered an area of 2.4 km by 2.4 km and is shown in Figure 5.1.
N 25300 m
Figure 5.1: Simulation scenario
In our simulations, the primary indicator examined is the probability for a
certain announcement to get validated. An announcement is validated when
its standard signature is constructed from t different partial signatures gen-
erated by t different cars. Those vehicles can belong to t different groups or
to only one group depending on whether the extended group-based protocol
or the semi-private protocol are used.
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A second indicator taken into account is the average number of differ-
ent (t, n)-threshold signature schemes which are used when applying the ex-
tended group-based protocol. This indicator determines the time needed to
validate the announcements.
Both indicators are essential to evaluate whether our scheme is usable in
real VANETs.
In the next subsection, the optimal values for the parameters used in
our system are studied. The goal of that study is to select the values for
parameters based on the two indicators stated above for a wide range of
vehicle densities. When the system is running, parameter values cannot
be easily modified, so a parameter choice must be made which works well
under several road conditions. The lessons learned from the simulations are
summarized in the last subsection.
The results given in what follows are average values obtained from 100
executions performed for each parameter choice.
Parameter selection
Vehicle density is expressed in vehicles/km2. This value is changed by varying
the total number of vehicles in the scenario represented in Figure 5.1.
Let t stand for the minimum number of vehicles needed to validate an
announcement. Each vehicle should belong to a different group when using
the extended group-based protocol. Under the semi-private protocol there
are no group constraints.
Table 5.2 shows the average probability p1 of a certain announcement to
be validated using the extended group-based protocol for fixed r and several
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Table 5.2: Average validation probability p1 and average number i of different
threshold signature schemes tried for the extended group-based protocol,
for constant number of groups r = 10. Average validation probability p2
for the semi-private protocol when the extended group-based protocol fails.
Results are given as a function of vehicle density and the minimum number
of validating vehicles t.
Vehic. dens. t = 4 t = 5 t = 6
p1 i p2 p1 i p2 p1 i p2
6.94 0.48 1.67 0.07 0.24 1.81 0.12 0.00 N/A 0.04
8.68 0.64 1.69 0.02 0.33 1.74 0.05 0.04 2.00 0.04
12.15 0.70 1.25 0.01 0.40 1.80 0.04 0.20 1.60 0.11
15.62 0.72 1.22 0.00 0.44 1.70 0.04 0.36 1.85 0.10
17.36 0.76 1.17 0.00 0.68 1.59 0.09 0.52 1.57 0.08
24.31 0.94 1.14 0.00 0.76 1.53 0.02 0.72 1.67 0.11
31.25 0.96 1.13 0.00 0.92 1.17 0.00 0.81 1.51 0.05
38.19 0.96 1.09 0.00 0.94 1.08 0.00 0.89 1.48 0.00
45.14 1.00 1.00 N/A 0.94 1.09 0.00 0.92 1.33 0.00
52.08 1.00 1.00 N/A 1.00 1.00 N/A 0.96 1.26 0.00
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values of t. Value i indicates the average number of different threshold signa-
ture schemes tried (each one is used until a timeout occurs) in order to vali-
date the announcement with the extended group-based protocol. When the
number of different threshold signature schemes tried for a certain announce-
ment reaches the number d of available schemes without the announcement
being validated under any of them, the semi-private protocol is launched.
We have set d = 3 given the values i obtained in preliminary simulations.
This will be further explained below.
Value p2 is the average probability of validating the announcement under
the semi-private protocol when the extended group-based protocol fails. Note
that the semi-private protocol is a tolerable fallback for low vehicle densities.
For higher vehicle densities, the probability p1 of successful validation with
the extended group-based protocol is already very high, so that the instances
in which the semi-private protocol is used as a fallback are very difficult
ones (e.g. very sparse locations); this explains the near zero p2 values for
higher densities. Also, the N/A value for p2 means that there was no need
to call the semi-private protocol. We have set d′ = 20 as the number of
different threshold signature schemes available in the semi-private protocol;
this should yield a good trade-off between unlinkability and implementation
cost in the vehicles.
Results in Table 5.2 are given as a function of vehicle density and the
minimum number of validating groups t. For this experiment, the number of
groups of vehicles was set to r = 10. The dependency on this value r will be
studied below, in Table 5.3.
It can be observed in Table 5.2 that both validation probabilities p1 and
p2 decrease as t increases, no matter whether the VANET is sparse or dense.
This is not surprising because validation is ”easier” for smaller t; however,
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the price paid is that for smaller t the trustworthiness of a validated message
is lower. Following this argument, it is also expected that for very sparse
networks (vehicle density of 6.94) and high t values (t = 6 for instance) the
extended group-based protocol is unable to validate a single announcement;
in fact, not even the semi-private protocol works properly in that setting
(p2 = 0.04 for a vehicle density of 6.94). As a trade-off between trustwor-
thiness and availability, it is suggested to take t = 4 or t = 5 depending
on the desired trustworthiness level for the announcements. In fact, t = 5
is the highest reasonable value because, even though t = 6 works fine for
dense VANETs (vehicle density above 38.19), it does not for medium-density
(p1 = 0.52 for a density of 17.36) and sparse VANETs. Since a threshold
must be chosen which works properly under several road conditions, it is
better to select t < 6. In what follows, t = 4 is taken.
Simulation shows that the average number i of different threshold signa-
ture schemes tried by the extended group-based protocol decreases when the
vehicle density increases and increases when the threshold t increases. All in
all, usually i ≤ 2 whenever validation is successful, which is the usual out-
come for medium- to high-density VANETs and moderate threshold (t = 4).
For very sparse networks, validation mainly relies on the semi-private pro-
tocol so we can choose the number d of signature schemes for the extended
group-based protocol by considering only medium- to high-density VANETs.
Thus a choice of d = 3 is fair enough and is assumed in what follows; this
implies that at most 3 × timeout milliseconds are spent on the extended
group-based protocol (as said above, for t = 4 we consider timeout = 200
milliseconds, so the overall time spent on the extended group-based protocol
is 600 ms).
Table 5.3 shows the average probability p1 of a certain announcement
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Table 5.3: Average validation probability p1 for the extended group-based
protocol and average validation probability p2 for the semi-private protocol
when the extended group-based protocol fails; average group size g is shown
too. Results are given as a function of vehicle density and number of groups
r, for constant threshold t = 4
Vehic. dens. r = 8 r = 10 r = 15
p1 p2 g p1 p2 g p1 p2 g
6.94 0.33 0.08 5.0 0.48 0.07 4.0 0.54 0.01 2.7
8.68 0.38 0.05 6.2 0.64 0.02 5.0 0.66 0.03 3.3
12.15 0.52 0.04 8.7 0.70 0.01 7.0 0.76 0.00 4.7
15.62 0.67 0.00 11.2 0.72 0.00 9.0 0.76 0.00 6.0
17.36 0.71 0.00 12.5 0.76 0.00 10.0 0.88 0.00 6.7
24.31 0.86 0.00 17.5 0.94 0.00 14.0 0.96 0.00 9.3
31.25 0.93 0.00 22.5 0.96 0.00 18.0 1.00 N/A 12.0
38.19 0.94 0.00 27.5 0.96 0.00 22.0 1.00 N/A 14.7
45.14 0.97 0.00 32.5 1.00 N/A 26.0 1.00 N/A 17.3
52.08 1.00 N/A 37.5 1.00 N/A 30.0 1.00 N/A 20.0
being validated using the extended group-based protocol for fixed t and sev-
eral values of r. If this protocol fails, the semi-private fallback is launched.
Value p2 represents the average probability of validating a message with the
semi-private protocol when the extended group-based protocol fails. Finally,
value g represents the average group size. All results are given as a function
of vehicle density and the number of groups of vehicles r. A value of r must
be set which works fine for very different vehicle densities. Also, r must be
chosen considering the trade-off between unlinkability and availability (see
related discussion in Section 5.2.3): value r should be greater than t in order
to guarantee availability (i.e., so that finding t endorsing vehicles from dif-
ferent groups is easy). However, a big r implies that the group size g is small
(g := n/r). In this way, the unlinkability of a certain vehicle is poor. In con-
trast, for a small r, the unlinkability of a certain vehicle is very high but the
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validation probability decreases. Table 5.3 reflects the availability problems
of the system in very sparse VANETs when a certain unlinkability level is
demanded. More specifically, we can observe that with a vehicle density of
6.94 and an average group size g = 5.0 (which occurs when r = 8), the prob-
ability p1 of a certain announcement to be validated is 0.33. Note that larger
group sizes (which imply r  8) will yield worse availability results. When
availability problems arise, the system resorts to the semi-private protocol
(which is less good in terms of privacy, unless d′ is extremely high).
According to the above considerations, r = 10 is taken as a reasonable
trade-off between unlinkability and availability for all vehicle densities.
Note. As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, unlinkability is proportional to the
group size g. One might object that the average group size in the simulations
is small, which is true because the small geographical area considered (2.4
km by 2.4 km) can only accommodate a small number of vehicles. However,
the purpose of the simulation is to evaluate the validation probability, which
is independent of the group size (it only depends on the threshold t, the
number of groups r and the vehicle density). In a real scenario (e.g. the
EU-15 area with 170 million vehicles mentioned in [Eea08], the same t and r
values used in the simulations can be employed, which will result in a very
large group size g guaranteeing high unlinkability.
Lessons learned from the simulation
The probability of successful validation depends on the threshold t, the num-
ber r of groups and the vehicle density, regardless of the group size. For a
fixed density, the greater r with respect to t, the higher the success proba-
bility. The closer r to t, the lower the success probability.
All simulations performed reflect that with the parameter selection used
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(t = 4, r = 10 and d = 3), our proposal provides message trustworthiness
and vehicle unlinkability under different road conditions. Results show that
our scheme performs best in medium- to high-density VANETs (densities
from 12.15 to 52.08). Nevertheless, it works fair enough in very sparse envi-
ronments as well:
• For a vehicle density 6.94, our scheme achieves a success probability
p1 = 0.48 in announcement validation with the extended group-based
protocol. In the cases when this protocol fails, the semi-private one
works with a probability p2 = 0.07.
• For a vehicle density 8.68, the success probability with the extended
group-based protocol increases to p1 = 0.64. The semi-private protocol
used as a fallback earns an additional p2 = 0.02.
The low success in validation for sparse VANETs should be put in context:
in an area with very low traffic, it is often less critical to get announcements
on road conditions, as there is hardly anyone who can benefit from them.
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Private resource access in social
networks
In Section 1.1.4, we pointed out the need to design privacy-preserving re-
source access protocols for social networks.
Regarding this topic, the latest proposals [Carm07, Domi07] in the liter-
ature provide private resource access in social networks by enabling private
relationships between the users of the network. Even though [Domi07] over-
comes the limitations detected in [Carm07], it also has some shortcomings
that should be solved, which were discussed in detail in Section 2.4. We next
summarize them:
• In that system, a certain user with a small number of relationships
is likely to stay isolated at certain periods of time (e.g. early in the
morning). At these periods, that user will be unable to get resources
from other users.
• In that proposal, the resource owner learns the relationships between
the users who collaborate in the resource access. This represents a
121
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privacy threat which would justify that some users might refuse col-
laboration. Nodes that refuse to collaborate cause other nodes to stay
isolated.
In this chapter, we present a new protocol which offers the same fea-
tures of [Carm07] and [Domi07] while addressing the drawbacks left open
in [Domi07]. However, these shortcomings are not solved without cost: we
assume the existence of an optimistic trusted third party (TTP) which only
acts in case of conflict between the users of the social network. The opti-
mistic TTP is not needed during the normal network execution. Therefore,
we argue that this solution performs better than a (non-optimistic) TTP
mediating all access requests.
Our scheme prevents the resource owner from learning the relationships
and the trust levels between the users who collaborate in the resource ac-
cess. In this way, the privacy threat detected in [Domi07] is solved and the
number of users who might refuse collaboration due to privacy concerns is
minimized. As a result, the chances for certain nodes to become isolated at
certain periods of time are reduced.
The protocol we present uses multiplicative privacy homomorphisms. The
needed cryptographic background is provided in Section 6.1. Section 6.2
presents our scheme in detail. This work has been published in [Domi08].
6.1 Multiplicative privacy homomorphisms
Privacy homomorphisms (PHs) are encryption transformations mapping a
set of operations on cleartext to another set of operations on ciphertext. Ba-
sically, PHs are encryption functions E : CT → CT ′ allowing a set F ′ of
operations on a ciphertext domain CT ′ to be carried out without knowledge
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of the decryption function D. Knowledge of D allows the result of the cor-
responding set F of operations on a cleartext domain CT to be retrieved.
A PH is called multiplicative when its set F of cleartext operations contains
multiplication. A PH is called probabilistic if the encryption algorithm E
involves some random mechanisms to choose the ciphertext corresponding to
a given cleartext from a set of possible ciphertexts.
Privacy homomorphisms that will be used in our proposal below must be
multiplicative, probabilistic and public-key. ElGamal [Elga85] is a probabilis-
tic public-key cryptosystem of integers in the multiplicative group Z∗p, where
p is a large prime. This cryptosystem has a multiplicative homomorphic
property which fulfills all these requirements.
6.2 Homomorphic access control protocol for
social networks
We follow the framework from [Carm07] modified according to [Domi07],
that is, we consider that the node owning a resource rid (hereafter, the
resource owner) establishes an access rule AR = (rid, AC) where AC is the
set of access conditions to be simultaneously satisfied to access rid. Several
alternative access rules can be defined for a resource. An access condition
is a tuple ac = (v, rt, tmin) where v is the resource owner. Such node must
have a direct or indirect relationship with the node requesting resource rid
(hereafter, the requestor), and rt, tmin are, respectively, the type and the
minimum trust level that the relationship should have. The trust level t is
a rational value such that 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. We use a privacy homomorphism
to encrypt the trust values contributed by the nodes in the social network.
However, multiplicative homomorphisms are only available for integers in the
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current literature. According to that, we propose to encode rational trust
values as integer fractions; the details of the coding are given in Section 6.2.1.
Even though we use access rules and access conditions in a way similar to
proposals [Carm07, Domi07], note that we differ from such schemes in that we
do not use the maximum depth of the relationship as a requirement in access
conditions. We have eliminated it because knowledge of the depth might
be used by the resource owner to infer the trust level of the relationships
between the users who collaborate in the resource access. We argue that this
does not represent any security loss for the scheme since the minimum trust
level and the type of the relationship are conditions that should be enough
to decide whether a certain user can get access to a certain resource.
Each user Ui in the network owns two key pairs represented by (SKi, PKi)
and (SSKi, PSKi). The former key pair corresponds to a public-key proba-
bilistic multiplicative privacy homomorphism and it is used to encrypt/decrypt.
The latter key pair is used to sign/verify. SKi and SSKi are the private keys.
The corresponding public keys, PKi and PSKi, are assumed to be known
and accepted by all users who have some interest in getting in touch with
Ui. In the rest of this chapter, one-to-one communications are assumed to be
confidential and authenticated (by properly using encryption and message
authentication codes).
We agree with [Domi07] in that access should be enforced based on the
relationship path between requestor and resource owner that yields the max-
imum trust level. This differs from the ideas presented in [Carm06, Carm07]
where the trust level is computed taking into account all paths between re-
questor and resource owner, which might lead to overprotection: a requestor
with a highly trusted direct relationship to the owner might be denied access
just because there is also a requestor-owner indirect relationship with low
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trust through a third user.
We next explain how to encrypt rational numbers used as trust levels
by means of a homomorphism for integer values. Then, a simple version of
our access control enforcement protocol is described in Section 6.2.2 which
will help the reader to understand the new scheme. After that, the privacy
problems that arise when using such a simple protocol will be discussed.
Then, an enhanced solution will be described. Last but not least, it will
be explained how the resource owner finally transmits his resource to the
requestor (assuming the resource owner accepts the requestor).
6.2.1 Homomorphic encryption of rational values
As explained previously, users cannot encrypt rational numbers directly. Ac-
cording to that, we propose that users send fractions which will represent the
real number linked to a certain trust value. As an example, a certain user Ui
who wants to contribute a trust value of 0.3̂ will send fraction 1/3 instead of
the rational number. Note that the numerator and the denominator of the
fraction are integers which can be encrypted in two different ciphertexts. Two
different users U1 and U2 can multiply their own trust values (represented
as fractions αU1/βU1 and αU2/βU2 respectively) in the ciphertext domain by






where E() denotes the encryption of a certain value following the privacy
homomorphism in use and ⊗ denotes the ciphertext operation of such a
cryptosystem corresponding to cleartext multiplication. At the end of the
protocol, a user who is able to decrypt both resulting ciphertexts (E(αU1 ·αU2)
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and E(βU1 · βU2)) can divide the two recovered integer values to obtain the
trust value as a rational number.
Nevertheless, this proposal introduces a privacy vulnerability: the user
who is able to decrypt the ciphertexts may gain some clues from the resulting
numerator and denominator on which fractions have been used to compute
the final trust value. Since such fractions correspond to the trust values
contributed by the users of the network, we argue that such information
disclosure should be prevented. To address this situation we propose that,
prior to encryption, each user Ui generates a random value ωUi that will be
used to hide into a jumble of factors the numerator αUi and the denominator
βUi that represent Ui’s trust. Such hiding process is performed by multiplying
numerator and denominator by ωUi:
E(αUi · ωUi)
E(βUi · ωUi)
where ωUi is generated by multiplying a random sample (without replace-
ment) of the prime numbers between 1 and a parameter n. Each prime is
selected for the sample with probability γ. Each selected prime is raised to
the power of an integer randomly selected between 1 and x (this integer is
different for each prime).
Our scheme relies on multiplicative privacy homomorphisms to preserve
the privacy of the users. Assuming that the privacy homomorphism in use is
defined in the group Z∗p, the multiplication of all encrypted values must yield
a result below p; otherwise information loss will occur. For the ciphertext
containing the multiplication of all numerators this means
s∏
i=1
(αUi · ωUi) < p (6.1)
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where s is the total number of users whose trust is multiplied. An inequal-
ity analogous to Expression (6.1) can be written for the ciphertext containing
the multiplication of all denominators. We next discuss which are the proper
values for the parameters involved in those inequalities.
Parameter selection
As stated above, our scheme requires that the multiplication of encrypted
numerators, resp. denominators, yields a result below p. The numerator αUi
and the denominator βUi are the two elements of the fraction which represents
Ui’s trust value. Both elements are integers in the range [0, . . . , k]. Value
k is selected depending on the accuracy desired for the trust levels. As an
example, with k = 100 we will guarantee an accuracy of two decimals: 0.93
can be represented by 93/100 or by 15/16 (numerators and denominators
must be equal to or less than k). In what follows, k = 100 is taken.
Expression (6.1) depends on parameter s, which represents how many
trust values will be multiplied together. In Section 6.2.6 we argue that usually
s ≤ 6. Nevertheless, we will fix it to s = 7 to leave enough room for situations
with more trust levels to be multiplied.
In terms of length, the worst case for ω occurs when all prime numbers
in [1, . . . , n] are selected, and all of them are raised to the power of x (the
maximum value). In order to compute the maximum length, we assume that
all n numbers are selected (prime or not). According to that, (n!)x is an
upper bound on ω. It means that
∏s
i=1(αUi ·ωUi) will be at most (k · (n!)x)s.
The length of this expression is:
|(k · (n!)x)s| = s · log2(k · (n!)x) = s · (log2(k) + x · log2(n!)) (6.2)
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If we set the length of p to 1024 bits, Expression (6.2) must stay below
1024 bits. Given k = 100 and s = 7, Table 6.1 shows values of n and x
such that this requirement holds. It can be observed that for x = 10 (which
is high enough), value n can be taken up to 7. In addition to that, if we
set n = 11 (which is high enough too), x can be increased up to 5. These
results prove that the proposed method for real number encoding is feasible
and works properly.
Note that the considered upper bound on ω is a loose one: all numbers
(prime or not) in 1, . . . , n are selected. An average length for ω considering
only the prime numbers can be computed as
∑
∀ prime i∈(1,...,n)
γ · x/2 · log2(i)
Table 6.1: For k = 100 and s = 7, upper bound given by Expression (6.2)
for different values of n and x
n s · (log2(k) + x · log2(n!))
x = 3 x = 5 x = 10 x = 15 x = 20
3 100.79 136.98 227.45 317.93 408.40
5 191.55 288.25 529.99 771.73 1013.47
7 304.79 476.98 907.45 1337.92 1768.40
11 576.77 930.27 1460.53 2697.81 3581.58
13 729.76 1185.26 2324.02 3462.78 4601.53
16 975.76 1595.26 3144.02 4692.77 6241.53
17 1061.60 1738.32 3430.14 5121.96 6813.77
6.2.2 Simple homomorphic protocol
We present in this subsection a first protocol using homomorphic encryption
to guarantee relationship privacy.
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Protocol 1 (Simple homomorphic protocol)
1. The resource owner B advertises to the network a certain resource
rid he wants to share. Such an advertisement is signed by B, and
contains all the access rules AR1, . . . , ARr defined for rid. That is,
{AR1, . . . , ARr}SSKB .
2. The requestor A is interested in rid. In order to gain access to that
resource, A sees to it that the resource owner receives one or several
relationship certificates proving that the requestor satisfies all access
conditions corresponding to at least one of the access rules. Several
cases can be distinguished depending on the relationship depth between
the requestor and the resource owner:
(a) Depth 1. A and B have a direct relationship, that is, A is related to
B through a relationship of type rt and trust level tAB represented
by a tuple (rt, tAB) and B is related to A through a relationship
(rt, tBA). Note that the relevant trust level here is tBA (how much
B trusts A) which is assumed to be unknown to A. In this case
A directly asks B whether he is granted access to the resource on
the basis of (rt, tBA). If B evaluates that rt and tBA satisfy the
set of access conditions targeted by A, then A is granted access.
Otherwise, A is required to resort to other direct relationships or
indirect relationships.
(b) Depth 2. If A and B have no direct relationships (or these are
not enough to buy access to A) then A asks to all users with whom
A is directly related whether they have direct relationships of the
relevant type rt with B. Assume C is directly related to both A
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and B with relationship type rt. Then C sends to B a pair of
messages PKB(rt), PKB(tCA) encrypted under the public key of
the resource owner B.
The trust values are rational values homomorphically encrypted as
fractions as detailed in Section 6.2.1. According to that, PKB(tCA)
corresponds to:
PKB(tCA)⇔ PKB(αCA · ωCA)
PKB(βCA · ωCA)
However, for the sake of readability, we prefer to write PKB(tCA)
instead of the above fraction. Note that the encryption of the re-
lationship type rt is simpler, because it is not a rational number.
After C has sent to B the pair PKB(rt), PKB(tCA), C tells A
that a message was sent to B, but does not reveal its content. At
this point B evaluates whether a relationship of type rt and trust
level tCA · tBC is enough to grant access of A to rid.
(c) Depth 3. If access at depth less than or equal to 2 cannot be
obtained then A requests to users C directly related to him to at-
tempt access with depth 2 on A’s behalf: each C directly related
to A contacts his other directly related users D about possible di-
rect relationships between D and B (similarly to what A did in
Step 2b). If a D with direct relationships to C and B exists, D
must multiply his own trust value related to C times the current
trust value which comes from C. To do that, D computes:
PKB(tCA · tDC) = PKB(tCA)⊗ PKB(tDC)
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where ⊗ denotes the ciphertext operation of the privacy homomor-
phism corresponding to cleartext multiplication. According to the
homomorphic fraction coding described in Section 6.2.1, PKB(tCA)⊗
PKB(tDC) corresponds to:
PKB(tCA)⊗ PKB(tDC)⇔ PKB(αCA · ωCA)⊗ PKB(αDC · ωDC)
PKB(βCA · ωCA)⊗ PKB(βDC · ωDC)
The former expression implies the following correspondence:
PKB(tCA · tDC)⇔ PKB(αCA · ωCA · αDC · ωDC)
PKB(βCA · ωCA · βDC · ωDC)
Finally, D sends a message containing (PKB(rt), PKB(tCA ·tDC))
to B. Upon receiving this message, B evaluates whether a rela-
tionship of type rt and trust level tCA · tDC · tBD is enough to grant
access of A to rid. Note that B receives the product tCA · tDC,
but he cannot discover the individual trust levels which have been
multiplied.
Figure 6.1 represents a path between the requestor A and the re-
source owner B through the social network. The picture shows
the encrypted trust value as computed on its way from A towards
B. The ciphertext containing the relationship type (rt) has been
omitted.
(d) Successive depths. In case of failure at depth 3, successive depths
are tried in a similar way.
Remark. When the resource owner advertises the access rules for a
resource, the access conditions in those rules leak the relationships the owner
is involved in (e.g. if the owner accepts rt = ’Colleague at company X’ this
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Figure 6.1: Resource request in the simple homomorphic protocol
means that he works at Company X). In [Carm07] the relationship type is
kept confidential through a rather complex symmetric encryption scheme.
A first problem of this scheme arises when the same relationship type is
encrypted using two different keys by two different user communities and
these merge at a later stage; another, perhaps more serious problem is how to
revoke the key used to encrypt a given relationship type. An alternative and
simpler strategy is to “camouflage” the real relationship types among a large
number of bogus relationships; then access conditions are published some of
which use real relationship types and most of which use bogus relationship
types. A bogus relationship type rt′ is one that has never been established by
the owner with anyone, so that no one can request access based on rt′. The
advantage is that a snooper cannot tell bogus relationships from real ones,
so that he does not know which relationships the owner is actually involved
in.
6.2.3 Anonymous homomorphic protocol
Protocol 1 above is unsafe if nodes are not anonymous and there is a rela-
tionship of depth 2 between requestor and owner. We next explain why. Let
A be a requestor, C be an intermediate node and B be a resource owner.
During the protocol B gets PKB(tCA) and decrypts it to obtain tCA, that is,
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the trust level assigned by C to A. This represents an unavoidable privacy
problem in Protocol 1, as B needs to compute tCA · tBC in order to evaluate
whether A is trusted enough to access a resource. Of course, one might argue
that B does not know how many nodes there are between C and A (there
might be several, and tCA might be the product of the trust levels between C
and A); however, this seems a rather weak protection, because nodes are not
anonymous. Worse yet, the above weakness can easily spread. Once tCA is
learnt by B, for any path of length 3 D-A-C-B, then B will learn tAD. And
so on.
To avoid that, we propose to enforce anonymity for nodes which are not
directly related. For example, in a path of length 3 A-C-D-B, this kind of
anonymity means that B only knows D and he has no knowledge about which
nodes or how many nodes are behind D; also, D only knows C, but not A.
Furthermore, also for the sake of anonymity, C should not know that A is the
requestor; in order to make himself undistinguishable from an intermediate
node, A sends to C an encrypted trust value, which in A’s case must be an
encryption of the initial neutral trust 1, that is PKB(1) (note that, since
we are assuming the use of probabilistic homomorphic encryption, C cannot
discover that PKB(1) is an encryption of the maximum trust 1).
As mentioned above, node anonymity was previously proposed in [Wang06].
However, node re-identification in that scheme was still possible because rela-
tionship types and trust levels were public. In our scheme, we combine node
anonymity with encryption of trust levels, in order to provide real privacy
for the users of the social network.
A problem which arises is that dishonest users may take advantage of
anonymity to disrupt the system without being punished. We propose a
liability mechanism to thwart such disruption.
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Liability mechanism
In our scheme, anonymity exists in indirect relationships (with depth greater
than one), but direct relationships are non-anonymous: each node knows his
directly related nodes. Furthermore, we require that every pair of directly
connected nodes A and C should not only know but authenticate each other
before engaging in any protocol transaction between them. As a result, a
dishonest user E cannot impersonate a certain node of the social network
(for example node A) and she cannot repudiate being user E.
According to that, an intermediate node C directly related to (and thus
authenticated by) a resource owner B can be held liable by B for any harm
that results from the encrypted trust level that C forwards to B. In turn, C
can extend this liability to his direct relationships along the requestor-owner
path. This liability transmission is the same used in chained subcontracting
in daily life (e.g. the first subcontractor is liable in front of the main con-
tractor, the second subcontractor is liable in front of the first subcontractor
and so on).
Now, let us imagine that a resource owner B has followed the protocol and
he has given an anonymous node access to a certain resource (e.g. a movie).
Later on B discovers that this resource is being unlawfully re-distributed over
the Internet. Following our liability mechanism, B will point C as guilty since
C is the only user in the requestor-owner path known by B. Then B will
take proper countermeasures against C. In turn, C (if he is not the dishonest
user) will do the same with the direct node he knows and so on up to the
requestor.
This mechanism has a major problem: at the end of the process, all
users in the path pay the consequences of the misbehavior by a single node.
Therefore, this situation can discourage users from collaborating in resource
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access. To solve that, we add to our liability mechanism the use of certificates
as a proof of the direct relationship between two users in the access to a
certain resource. For example, in a path of length 3 A-C-D-B, user A will
give a certificate CertAC to C as a proof of their direct relationship in a
certain resource access. In turn, C gives a certificate CertCD to D and so on.
A certificate for a relationship where node N1 forwards the encrypted trust
level to node N2 is constructed as follows:
CertN1N2 ← {id||N1||N2||KN1(tN1N0)||time stamp}SSKN1 (6.3)
In Expression (6.3), id is the identifier assigned to a certain resource access
(which is linked to a certain item); N1 is the identity of the node who con-
structs and sends the certificate; N2 is the receiver; N0 is the node preceding
N1 and KN1(tN1N0) is the trust value that N1 assigns to N0 (encrypted under
a secret key KN1 only known by N1). Note that when N1 is the requestor,
N0 does not exist. In this case tN1N0 is taken to be 1, the neutral value for
multiplication. The certificate is signed by N1 and contains a time stamp
which reflects when it was generated. The public key PSKN1 for verification
is known and accepted as valid by all nodes in the network.
A user U who receives a certificate must store it in a safe place. Later
on, if someone in the relationship path misbehaves, U can use the certificate
to prove his innocence. We next explain how these certificates are used to
protect the system against a misbehaving node (whether it is a requestor or
an intermediate node).
Figure 6.2 represents the same situation shown in Figure 6.1 but following
our proposed anonymous homomorphic protocol. Figure 6.2 shows a resource
request from the point of view of the resource owner (node B). In this
situation, B only knows that the computed trust value contains a trust from
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D (tD?) but he does not know who is behind D. Actually, B does not know






Figure 6.2: Resource request in the anonymous homomorphic protocol (from
the point of view of the resource owner)
Regarding the computational cost, our anonymous homomorphic protocol
using the proposed liability mechanism requires intermediate nodes involved
in a protocol execution to perform the following operations:
1. Use the privacy homomorphism to encrypt a trust value t.
2. Compute the ciphertext operation of the privacy homomorphism on
the received encrypted trust value t′ and the own encrypted trust value
t.
3. Generate the certificate CertN1N2 required by the liability mechanism.
A resource requestor only executes operations (1) and (3). A resource owner
only decrypts the received ciphertexts containing the final trust value and
the relationship type. Later, the resource owner checks the set of access
conditions in plain text. Note that all these operations are feasible in full-
fledged computers (e.g. desktop computers, laptops, powerful mobile devices,
etc.). The social network that we envisage runs on this kind of devices so we
argue that our protocol will perform properly in terms of computation when
deployed in a real environment.
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Protecting the system by partial revocable anonymity
Nodes in the relationship path can misbehave in two different ways:
• A requestor who has gained access to a certain resource can later un-
lawfully re-distribute it over the Internet.
• An intermediate node can contribute false trust levels to the relation-
ship path.
If the requestor misbehaves, an intermediate node U can use the certificate
he owns to prove to the resource owner that he is only an intermediate node
who has forwarded the encrypted trust level. In this way, node anonymity
vanishes, because each intermediate node publishes his direct relationship in
the path until the requestor is reached, who will be properly punished for
his misbehavior. This procedure has a major problem: a dishonest resource
owner can falsely pretend that a certain requestor has misbehaved in order
to gain knowledge of all the relationships in the owner-requestor path.
We deal with this situation by proposing partially rather than totally
revocable anonymity. According to that, we assume the existence of an
optimistic trusted third party who is able to access the certificates to judge
whether someone is misbehaving. In this way, the resource owner does not
get any information on the requestor-owner path. An optimistic TTP is a
trusted authority who only acts in case of conflict between the users of the
social network. It is not needed during the normal network operation, which
is much more efficient than requiring a (non-optimistic) trusted authority to
mediate all transactions.
We now turn to the second type of misbehavior, in which an intermediate
node contributes false trust levels to the relationship path. Even though
trust values are kept secret, a certain user A having a direct relationship
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
138 Private resource access in social networks
with another user B can make a good guess about the value of tBA. There
are two cases:
• If A relies on B’s help to access resources and B misbehaves by con-
tributing a fake tBA lower than the real one, A will end up suffering
a DoS attack. We believe that this situation should be avoided, or at
least limited to the extent possible. Precisely to that end, Expression
(6.3) includes the trust value tN1N0 contributed by the node N1 generat-
ing CertN1N2 . Since tN1N0 is encrypted under KN1 , nobody but N1 can
recover tN1N0 . However, if a user thinks that he is facing a DoS attack
from another user, he can report this situation to the optimistic TTP
who requests the secret key used by each intermediate node; then, the
optimistic TTP checks the trust values contributed by each interme-
diate node and takes action against those behaving dishonestly. Note
that no one but this authority will know the trust value associated to
each direct relationship.
• If an intermediate node contributes a fake trust level higher than the
original one, this can result in access being granted to a non-deserving
requestor. Beyond illegal access, other problems may arise if the re-
questor unlawfully re-distributes the accessed resource or abuses it in
other ways; see subsection above (which details the liability mechanism)
for a description of the defenses against a misbehaving requestor.
6.2.4 Accessing the resource
Our scheme is based on preserving node anonymity as long as nodes behave
honestly. For that reason, a resource owner B who accepts to send a certain
resource rid to a requestor D cannot transmit rid directly to D because the
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identity of the requestor is unknown to B. Instead of that, the resource must
follow in reverse order the same relationship path which was previously used
to decide on the requestor’s access.
If this store-and-forward process involves too much bandwidth consump-
tion for intermediate nodes (e.g. if the resource is a movie or some kind
of large item), an alternative is for the requestor to send together with his
query an ftp address where the resource owner can upload the resource. Note
that this option implicitly assumes the existence of a trusted third party:
by default, ftp downloading is not anonymous and in this case the ftp site
must be trusted to preserve the anonymity of all requestors who use it; if
some anonymizer is used between the requestor and the ftp site, then this
anonymizer is playing the role of a TTP who should preserve the anonymity
of the requestor. Whatever the case, since the TTP can be totally external
and unrelated to the social network or its users, assuming that such an entity
will keep secret the identity of the requestor seems plausible.
6.2.5 Security and privacy analysis
We next explain the assumed adversary model and the possible attacks the
system has to be robust against. Later, we detail the protocol behavior
against each considered attack.
Adversary model
Our attacker model assumes that the adversary is a node in the social net-
work. Such an adversary can collude with others to attack the system. We
consider that the computational power of an attacker does not permit him
to break current computationally secure cryptosystems.
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We divide the possible attacks in four categories. The first three cate-
gories refer to the role adopted by the attacker: intermediate node, resource
requestor and resource owner. The last category refers to collusions between
nodes. We next list the considered attacks within each category.
• Intermediate node.
– Learn the trust levels of the previous nodes in the requestor-owner
path.
– Alter the received trust or contribute a fake one.
– Refuse to collaborate.
• Resource requestor.
– Increase the trust sent by other users in order to get access to a
certain resource.
• Resource owner.
– Learn the trust levels of the nodes in the requestor-owner path.
• Collusion between nodes.
– Learn the trust level of an honest user surrounded by colluders.
Protocol behavior against the considered attacks
Learn the trust levels of the nodes in the requestor-owner path. This attack
can be performed by an intermediate node or by the resource owner.
The resource owner is able to decrypt the encrypted product of trust
levels and get the final trust value. However, the owner cannot learn
from that value which nodes have collaborated nor the individual trust
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 
Alexandre Viejo Galicia 
ISBN:978-84-691-8852-1/DL:T-1274-2008 
 
6.2 Homomorphic access control protocol for social networks 141
level contributed by each of them. An intermediate node is less dan-
gerous than the resource owner, because he does not know the secret
key needed to decrypt the received product of trust levels.
Alter the received trust or contribute a fake one. As said above, an inter-
mediate node can not learn the computed trust value received from his
“upstream” neighbor (the neighbor previous to him in the requestor-
owner path) because it is encrypted. However, the intermediate node
can replace the received trust value with any trust value he desires and
such a behavior will go undetected.
As explained in Section 6.2.3, our proposal uses certificates which con-
tain the trust values contributed by each node. In addition to that, we
assume the existence of an optimistic TTP who is able to check such
values and take action against dishonest nodes. We argue that both
measures will discourage users from performing this attack.
Refuse collaboration. An intermediate node can decide not to collaborate
in a resource access. There is no defense against this. However, in
our scheme there is no price to be paid by the intermediate nodes who
collaborate: the privacy toll in [Domi07] (mentioned in the introduc-
tion) is solved by our scheme and, with the use of an ftp service, an
intermediate node is not even required to spend any of his bandwidth
to enable resource access.
Therefore, intermediate nodes do not have any objective reason to
refuse collaboration. In fact, there is even an incentive for them to
collaborate: a node who routinely refuses collaboration will be in a
bad position when he later seeks collaboration as a resource requestor.
Unlawful trust increase. The resource requestor cannot unlawfully increase
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any trust level in the requestor-owner path because he does not see
any of the relationship messages exchanged between intermediate nodes
that will be used by the resource owner to decide whether the requestor
is granted access.
Collusion between nodes. Collusion between nodes is successful when ad-
versary nodes are surrounding the victim and the resource owner is one
of the colluding nodes. In this situation the colluders learn the trust
value which the victim has assigned to his adversary upstream neigh-
bor. However, we argue that the surrounded victim can decide not to
collaborate if he does not trust his neighbors (upstream or downstream)
or the owner (the identity of the latter is public, since he is offering a
resource).
6.2.6 Simulation
We have simulated our protocol in a realistic environment to observe its per-
formance. The network simulator ns-2 [Netw08] was used for this purpose.
Central to our proposal is the availability of on-line users who have re-
lationships between them and enable a certain requestor to get access to a
certain resource. Therefore, the lack of active users in the network is a po-
tential problem. After pondering this issue, we decided to check the impact
of the shortage of on-line users in small networks. For large networks with
lots of connected users, the problem is less likely. With this in mind, the
proposed scheme was tested in four social networks consisting, respectively,
of 100, 300, 500 and 1000 users.
In each social network, the connection topology between users and their
associated relationships were fixed as follows before starting the simulation:
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• Each user was connected to (i.e. held relationships with) a number
of users ranging between 1 and 30. The precise figure was decided
using the power-law distribution. As stated in [Libe05], typical social
networks are reasonably well approximated using this distribution. As
a result, in our simulated social network 78.76% of the users held a
number of connections ranging between 1 and 15. Also, 31.07% of the
users held only 1 or 2 connections.
• Each node could establish three different types of relationship with
other nodes. Up to one relationship of each type was allowed between
each pair of nodes, so that there could be up to three relationships
between two nodes. Whether there existed a relationship of a certain
type between two nodes was uniformly randomly decided.
• The trust level assigned to each existing relationship was randomly and
uniformly chosen in the range [0.5, 1].
A simulation test consisted of running a request by a requestor to access
a resource advertised by an owner. Both requestor and owner were randomly
chosen. The simulation ended when:
• either the requestor was granted access to the resource, which happened
if the resource owner could compute a trust value greater than or equal
to 0.4;
• or a time-out occurred (this happened when either no path existed
between requestor and owner or the existing paths yielded a computed
trust less than 0.4).
For each social network, several fractions of simultaneous on-line users
were considered: 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90%. For each fraction, 50 tests
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were run and the average results over the 50 tests were computed. The
results for the four social networks considered are shown in Tables 6.2, 6.3,
6.4 and 6.5. The contents of those tables are commented below.
Table 6.2: Results for a social network of 100 users
#on-line average average average average
nodes access prob. # interm. nodes #messages trust level
10 0.09 2.89 192.91 0.42
30 0.20 3.10 886.72 0.48
50 0.36 2.94 1221.30 0.59
70 0.50 3.44 1635.24 0.50
90 0.70 3.29 1825.60 0.46
Table 6.3: Results for a social network of 300 users
#on-line average average average average
nodes access prob. # interm. nodes #messages trust level
30 (10%) 0.11 3.33 260.00 0.50
90 (30%) 0.24 3.92 1298.25 0.49
150 (50%) 0.46 4.09 2493.65 0.45
210 (70%) 0.56 4.07 3009.82 0.42
270 (90%) 0.73 4.03 3616.33 0.44
Simulation results
For each social network and each fraction of on-line nodes (# on-line nodes),
the following results are reported:
• Average access probability. This is the average probability that a certain
access request is granted (i.e. that a computed trust greater than or
equal to 0.4 is obtained).
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Table 6.4: Results for a social network of 500 users
#on-line average average average average
nodes access prob. # interm. nodes #messages trust level
50 (10%) 0.14 4.00 683.75 0.46
150 (30%) 0.28 3.43 1353.14 0.62
250 (50%) 0.49 5.36 2163.32 0.41
350 (70%) 0.66 5.33 3593.15 0.43
450 (90%) 0.82 4.59 3771.22 0.41
Table 6.5: Results for a social network of 1000 users
#on-line average average average average
nodes access prob. # interm. nodes #messages trust level
100 (10%) 0.18 5.20 815.37 0.41
300 (30%) 0.32 4.92 2880.25 0.46
500 (50%) 0.52 5.67 3373.04 0.42
700 (70%) 0.71 5.47 4412.25 0.43
900 (90%) 0.89 4.71 4628.02 0.42
• Average number of intermediate nodes. This is the average number of
intermediate nodes in the path between the requestor and the resource
owner.
• Average number of messages. This is the average total number of mes-
sages generated by the nodes in the social network until the launched
resource request is granted or a time-out occurs.
• Average trust level. This is the average trust level for the accepted
requests.
From the results in Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, it can be observed that
better performance is obtained when there is a higher fraction of on-line
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users: the average access probability is higher and the requestor-owner path
is shorter. This is what one would expect.
It can be seen in those tables that when 30% or less users are on-line it
is difficult to get access to a resource. When 50% or more users are on-line
the system works reasonably well. Note that these results are obtained in
the worst possible scenario for our protocol: relatively small networks where
a big proportion of the users have no more than two, randomly established
connections. Under these circumstances, it is pretty likely that several nodes
find themselves isolated (without connections to other on-line nodes). In a
more realistic scenario with several human user communities with common
interests, it would be more likely for nodes in the same community to be
on-line at the same time and hold more connections between them. This
similarity of habits would render node isolation rarer, even if there is a low
fraction of on-line nodes.
Also, it can be observed that, whatever the proportion of on-line nodes,
the average number of intermediate nodes in a requestor-owner path is no
more than six. This should not be surprising, because social networks are
affected by the “six degrees of separation” phenomenon [Milg67]: long ago,
S. Milgram experimentally showed that any two people in the United States
are connected through about six intermediate acquaintances, implying that
we live in a rather small world. According to the “six degrees of separation”
concept, for huge social networks the separation between any two users will
still be a maximum of six intermediate nodes. This is good news for our
scheme in the sense that the number of generated messages until a resource
request is accepted does not grow linearly with the number of on-line nodes.
In fact, we can observe in Table 6.5 that the total number of messages sent is
quite similar when there are 300 and 900 on-line nodes. These results show
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that our proposal is scalable enough to work properly when deployed in real
social networks.
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In this thesis, we have pointed out the importance of providing security and
privacy for new emergent applications based on special-purpose networks.
More specifically, we have covered different security and privacy issues related
to some applications based on four types of special-purpose networks. These
are:
• Secure information transmission in many-to-one scenarios with resource-
constrained devices such as sensor networks.
• Secure and private information sharing in mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs).
• Secure and private information spread in vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETs).
• Private resource access in social networks.
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The primary concern has been to offer a broad overview of current tech-
niques for providing security and privacy in each environment.
Regarding many-to-one communications for resource-constrained devices,
we have focused on secure many-to-one lossless transmission. More precisely,
we have presented two new proposals following this paradigm.
Different models for information sharing in MANETs have been studied.
We have presented two new schemes dealing with security and privacy issues
in this environment.
How to provide trustworthy information spread over VANETs has been
studied in detail. More precisely, we have studied both a priori and a posteri
countermeasures against fake messages from internal attackers. We have
presented a system that relies on a priori countermeasures and provides
secure vehicle-generated announcements on VANETs. The new system has
been compared with current proposals in the literature.
Last but not least, we have addressed how to provide resource access in
social networks while preserving the privacy of the users. A new proposal
has been presented.
7.2 Results of this thesis
We summarize here the results presented in this thesis.
In Chapter 3, our contributions regarding efficient and secure many-to-
one symbol transmission have been presented. First, a new protocol that
provides an optimal message length has been proposed. The new protocol
works properly in environments where bandwidth is scarce. This protocol
uses multisignatures and offers the four basic security properties: confiden-
tiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Immediate detection
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of corrupted messages is provided too. Next, the first scheme in the literature
that offers secure many-to-one symbol transmission for sensor networks has
been proposed. This protocol also provides an optimal message length and it
is computationally suitable for resource-constrained devices, which are quite
common in sensor networks. We have referred to the computational capabil-
ities of real sensor devices to prove the deployability of this proposal in real
environments. This scheme achieves the following security properties: confi-
dentiality, authentication and integrity. Detection of corrupted messages is
performed using an a posteriori tracing algorithm.
Chapter 4 contains two contributions about information sharing in mo-
bile ad hoc networks. Both of them provide security and privacy for the
users of the network. Incentives are given to avoid user misbehavior. The
first construction provides information in a urban environment. A certain
user, regardless of her location, can request information any time using her
mobile device and its wireless connection. This system provides incentives
to encourage users to become distributed information servers. Regarding
the second contribution, it is a new scheme designed to disseminate adver-
tisements through mobile ad hoc networks. This proposal outperforms the
current proposals in literature by offering security and privacy without re-
quiring the participation of any trusted third party (except for a certification
authority that certifies the merchant’s public key). In addition to that, we
propose a new approach to reward nodes that collaborate in the dissemina-
tion according to how long they have been holding an advertisement. This
proposal does not bound the number of transfers for an advertisement (and
thus its spreading range) and rewards collaborative nodes with e-coins pro-
portionally to their task.
Chapter 5 presents a new system that provides secure vehicle-generated
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announcements on VANETs. This scheme relies on a priori measures against
internal attackers (vehicles in the VANET sending fake messages). Thanks
to the use of threshold signatures, our system outperforms previous proposals
in message length and computational cost. Regarding privacy, three different
variants of the system have been proposed to achieve privacy without losing
trustworthiness: the first variant is a special case of the second one and is
better suited to dense VANETs, whereas the second and third variants can
be used as fallbacks for sparse VANETs. The feasibility of this scheme has
been studied using simulations.
The last chapter of this thesis presents a privacy-preserving resource ac-
cess protocol for social networks. This new protocol achieves protection of
relationship privacy, with the advantage of being fault-tolerant and free of
mediating TTPs (although an optimistic TTP is used in case of conflict).
On the whole, our scheme offers the same features as [Carm07] and [Domi07]
while addressing the functionality and privacy drawbacks of those previous
protocols. The simulated performance of our proposal shows that it can
be successfully deployed in real environments because it is scalable and it
provides reasonable resource availability.
7.3 Future research
We sketch here some open problems that remain to be solved and possible
extensions to some of the presented contributions that will be addressed in
the future.
In the field of many-to-one communications, our future research will be
directed to design schemes for secure many-to-one lossy transmission. More
specifically, our objective is to design a scalable protocol that allows the
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base station to get the result of some mathematical function (e.g. Min/Max,
average computation...) applied to the data stored in the leaves. Such a
system should provide confidentiality, authentication and integrity to the
data transmitted from the leaves towards the root.
More research on vehicular ad hoc networks is planned. Our future work
in this field will be directed to the construction of a scheme that relies on a
posteriori measures against internal attackers.
Regarding private resource access protocols for social networks, the pre-
sented scheme should be extended to eliminate the need for an optimistic
TTP.
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[Viej08] A. Viejo, F. Sebé and J. Domingo-Ferrer, “Secure and scalable
many-to-one symbol transmission for sensor networks”, Computer Com-
munications, vol. 31, no. 10, pp. 2408–2413, 2008.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 




[Armk07] F. Armknecht, A. Festag, D. Westhoff and K. Zeng, “Cross-layer
privacy enhancement and non-repudiation in vehicular communication”,
4th Workshop on Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (WMAN), 2007.
[Ashr06] R. Ashri, S. D. Ramchurn, J. Sabater, M. Luck and N. R. Jennings,
“Trust evaluation through relationship analysis”, 4th International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, ACM, pp.
1005–1011, 2005.
[Barn06] S. B. Barnes, “A privacy paradox: social networking in the United
States”, First Monday, vol. 11, no. 9, 2006.
[Barr02] P. S. L. M. Barreto, H. Y. Kim, B. Lynn, and M. Scott, “Efficient
algorithms for pairing-based cryptosystems”, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 2442, pp. 354–368, 2002.
[Bene05] Z. Benenson, “Authenticated Queries in Sensor Networks”, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3813, pp. 54–67, 2005.
[Berg07] I. Berger, “Standards for car talk”, IEEE The Institute, vol. 31, no.
1, 2007.
[Berk04] University of California Berkeley, “Tiny OS Hardware Designs”,
2004. http://www.tinyos.net/scoop/special/hardware
157
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 




[BlaB05] E.-O. Blaß and M. Zitterbart, “Towards Acceptable Public-Key
Encryption in Sensor Networks”, ACM 2nd International Workshop on
Ubiquitous Computing, pp. 88–93, 2005.
[Blun97] C. Blundo and D. R. Stinson, “Anonymous secret sharing schemes”,
Discrete Applied Mathematics, vol. 77, pp. 13–28, 1997.
[Blun05] C. Blundo, S. Cimato and A. De Bonis, “Secure E-Coupons”, Elec-
tronic Commerce Research Journal, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 117–139, 2005.
[Bold03] A. Boldyreva, “Efficient threshold signatures, multisignatures and
blind signatures based on the Gap-Diffie-Hellman-group signature
scheme”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2567, pp. 31–46, 2003.
[Bone01] D. Boneh, B. Lynn and H. Shacham, “Short signatures from the
Weil pairing”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2248, pp. 514–
532, 2001.
[Butt00] L. Buttyan, J. Hubaux, “Enforcing service availability in mobile
ad-hoc WANs”, Proceedings of the 1st ACM MobiHoc, pp. 87–96, 2000.
[Butt03] L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux, “Stimulating Cooperation in Selforga-
nizing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, ACM/Kluwer Mobile Networks and
Applications, vol. 8, no. 5, 2003.
[C2cc08] CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium, 2008.
http://www.car-2-car.org
[Carm06] B. Carminati, E. Ferrari and A. Perego, “Rule-based access control
for social networks”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4278, pp.
1734–1744, 2006.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 




[Carm07] B. Carminati, E. Ferrari and A. Perego, “Private relationships in
social networks”, Private Data Management, IEEE Press, 2007.
[Cast05] C. Castelluccia, S. Jarecki, J. Kim and G.Tsudik, “Secure ac-
knowledgment aggregation and multisignatures with limited robust-
ness”, Computer Networks, vol. 50, no. 10, pp. 1639–1652, 2006.
[Chau89] D. Chaum, “Privacy Protected Payments: Unconditional Payer
and/or Payee Anonymity”, Smart Card 2000, pages 69–92. 1989.
[Chau90] D. Chaum, B. Den Boer, E. Van Heyst, S. Mjolsnes and A. Steen-
beek, “Efficient offline electronic checks (extended abstract)”, Proceed-
ings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic
Techniques on Advances in Cryptology, 1990.
[Damg01] I. Damg̊ard and M. Koprowski, “Practical threshold RSA signa-
tures without a trusted dealer”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
2045, pp. 152–165, 2001.
[Dimi05] T. Dimitriou, Efficient Mechanisms for Secure Inter-node and Ag-
gregation Processing in Sensor Networks, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 3738, pp. 18–31, 2005.
[Dimi06] T. Dimitriou, Securing Communication Trees in Sensor Networks,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4240, pp. 47–58, 2006.
[Djen05] D. Djenouri, L. Khelladi, A.N. Badache, A survey of security issues
in mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, IEEE Communications Surveys
& Tutorials, vol. 7, num. 4, pp. 2–28, 2005.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN SOME SPECIAL-PUROPSE NETWORKS 




[Domi04] J. Domingo-Ferrer, A. Mart́ınez-Ballesté and F. Sebé, “Secure re-
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